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Attention economies
Abstract
A new theoretical model is developed which describes the structure of competition for attention and
characterizes equilibria. The exogenous fundamentals of an attention economy are the space of receiving
subjects with their attention capacity, and the potential set of competing firms (senders) with their
radiation technology. The endogenous variables explained by the theory are equilibrium audiences (the
clients belonging to a sender), their signal exposure and attention, and the diversity of senders surviving
the contest for attention. Application of the equilibrium analysis suggests that international integration
or progress in information technologies tend to decrease global diversity. Local diversity, perceived by
the individual receivers, may increase nonetheless.
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Abstract
Attracting attention is a basic feature of economic life but no standard economic
problem. A new theoretical model is developed which describes the general structure
of competition for attention and characterizes equilibria. The exogenous fundamen-
tals of an attention economy are the space of receiving subjects with their attention
capacity, and the potential set of competing companies (senders) with their radia-
tion technology. The endogenous variables explained by the theory are equilibrium
audiences (the clients belonging to a company), their signal exposure and atten-
tion, and the diversity of senders surviving the contest for attention. Application
of the equilibrium analysis to changes in information technologies and globalization
suggests that international integration or range-increasing technical progress may
decrease global diversity. Local diversity, perceived by the individual receivers, may
increase nonetheless.
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1 Introduction
What determines the set of items we perceive and why does the diversity of perceived
objects and agents change?  Suppose you are a reader of economic articles. Apart from
your interests, you have individual characteristics like brain capacity or distractions by
non-economic stuﬀ. They put a limit to your processing of economic literature. Thus,
you focus attention on important sites and outlets of publications. And important is who
produces many powerful papers and gets the attention of the scientiÞc community or,
more generally, of the ensemble of producers and consumers of scientiÞc work. Range
and diversity of the important agents and places on which this ensemble focuses have
changed over time. In particular, some local heroes have become global heroes and other
local heroes have disappeared at all. Obviously, the circle that producers try to attract
attention and consumers pay attention to producers who send powerful signals is not
bound to scientiÞc research but applies to the (economic) world in general. An account
of the many current trends of attention management and the practical implications for
doing business was recently presented by Davenport and Beck [2001] under the title The
Attention Economy.1 The title indicates that the issue of attracting attention really
adds a new dimension to an economy.
Psychologists and behavioral economics have long been aware of the problem of limited
attention. As Herbert A. Simon pointed out, in an information-rich world a new scarcity
problem arises, namely, a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What
information consumes is obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a
wealth of information creates a poverty of attention (Simon [1971], p. 40). Nonetheless,
Camerer [2003] lists the concept of limited attention among the topics neglected until
1A Þrst draft of this paper was written 2001 before I have got knowledge of their book. That I
independently chose almost the same title underlines that the subject is topical. My interest in it was
raised by the art journalKunstforum, whose December 1999 issue focused on Ressource Aufmerksamkeit
(see also Goldhaber [1997] and Frank [1998]). Shapiro and Varian [1999] discuss business strategies for
attracting attention by customizing information.
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recently. Gabaix, Laibson and Moloche [2003] presented Þrst experimental evidence of
individual allocation of attention. Like Simon they focus on the question how subjects
allocate their attention capacity (a given time budget) on a given set of information sources
when they have to solve one or more choice problems. In such an approach, focussing on
the users of information, the agenda that subjects have to deal with is given. In contrast
to this, my focus is on the sender side of the problem. The reason for the crowded agenda
is that many agents attempt to attract attention by sending information. Wealth of
information means more senders are grabbing for attention or the given set of attention
grabbing agents is trying harder by sending stronger signals. Under this focus the central
question is which and how many information sources succeed in getting enough attention
to be viable. Put diﬀerently: Given that the agenda of people is crowded, who and what
is on the agenda if an overabundant set of potential items compete for being there.2 For
answering this question, an economy is considered as a system of agents (senders) who try
to attract the attention of subjects (receivers) by producing and distributing information
packages (signals). The senders may be Þrms, news agencies, scientiÞc networks, political
parties etc., promoting products, persons or ideas. They are addressed also as companies
or Þrms in this paper, since they typically consist of more than one individual. (However,
the interior structure of companies is not considered.) The central question to be answered
is then: What is an equilibrium outcome if each company tries to attract the attention of
subjects by exposing them to the signal Look at me or Read my message?
Several authors began to study the consequences of limited attention for economic
equilibrium  in single markets or at the macroeconomic level. Sims [2003] pointed out
that macroeconomic analysis should not rely on some exogenous notion of noise when
dealing with the question how rational agents process economic data. Optimal allocation
of attention endogenously determines which part of data is to be tracked as important
2Limited attention capacity has not only implications for individual behavior or business strategies
but also consequences for the (equilibrium) outcome in markets or in the whole economy. To stress this
aspect I use the label attention economies rather than economics of attention for addressing the
subject of this paper.
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and to which part no attention should be paid. Gabaix and Laibson [2002] provide an
explanation of the equity-premium puzzle by arguing that consumers  due to attention
allocation costs  can only respond to a fraction of realizations of equity returns. Hirsh-
leifer, Lim and Teoh [2002] and Hirshleifer and Teoh [2003] analyze the implications of
limited attention for Þrms information policy and the Þnancial market equilibrium. Like
in behavioral research on the allocation of attention, also in these contributions the set of
information sources is exogenously given  published macroeconomic time series, equity
returns, earnings of Þrms. The purpose of this paper is to determine endogenously the
number of information sources and the volume of signals to which subjects are exposed
when many information suppliers are grabbing for their attention. For this purpose I
propose a receiver model, based on psychological evidence, but simply enough to be used
in general equilibrium analysis. I abstract from decision processes within receivers and
treat them as black boxes reacting to signal exposure in possibly heterogeneous, but ex-
ogenously given ways. Fortunately, rich empirical research on the psychology of attention
(see e.g. Kahneman [1973] and Pashler [1998]) provides some robust features of how sub-
jects react to stimulus exposures. The details of these features and their translation into
a formal receiver model are presented in Section 2.3. Formulated loosely, subjects turn
attention to those information sources, which are loud i.e., send with relatively strong
signal strength. Such unsophisticated receiver behavior is not only motivated by prag-
matic reasons. Before subjects can value and choose items they must get aware of them.
This involves an interaction between producers and consumers beyond the exchange of
speciÞc contents.3 The essential dimension in this meta-interaction is how many units
of a receivers attention capacity, e.g. time, are absorbed by signals targeted on her or
him.
3Also trash absorbs attention capacity before you can scrap it. As is well known, the purchase of
information can never be based on perfect information. Even recognized noise, destroying the possibility
to focus on other things, cannot always be turned oﬀ. This is an important diﬀerence between the
problem of attention economies and Rosens [1981] Economics of Superstars, where consumers have a
choice between services of diﬀerent quality and their willingness to pay for a unit of service is higher if
the service comes from a more talented producer.
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In spite of analogies to conventional economic competition, reßected in formulations
like paying and earning attention, attention is not just another economic good. We
do not observe markets at which the good attention is exchanged among traders at
some given price. Attentiveness is a characteristic which can hardly be fully protected
by property rights. Neither is it possible for the sender of signals to acquire full control
of a persons attentiveness, nor can a person who wants to stay connected with the out-
side world fully control the exposure to signals trying to get her attention. Moreover,
attention is a general mental resource. Who and whatever exposes you to signals can
absorb some of your attention. The signals may refer to products, politics, science or
entertainment. Unlike with advertising single products or signalling private information
in single markets, it is not the processing of speciÞc information content which matters for
an individuals attention level but the aggregate volume and strength of signals to which
she or he is exposed. Thus, the interaction of subjects sending signals for attracting the
attention of other subjects has something in common with congestion or emissions in a
public space. But again, there are essential diﬀerences. Whereas polluters simply want
to get rid of their emissions somewhere, senders produce and target signals to achieve
impact. In this paper, an attention economy is modelled as a family of senders, which
employ costly signals to attract the attention of receivers characterized by their attention
capacity. Only those who succeed in attracting enough attention can participate in sub-
sequent economic interaction which generates earnings. The paper doesnt consider any
details of this economic interaction but assumes that earnings are positively related to
attracted attention (impact). The focus is on competitive attention grabbing. There is no
strategic interaction. Single senders have zero measure and take attention levels as given
when making their choices. The senders simultaneous pursue of impact together with
the individuals attention capacity determine equilibrium signal exposure, equilibrium at-
tention levels and equilibrium allocations of audiences to senders. Of course, audiences
can overlap and an individual is typically a member of several audiences. This gives us a
measure for the diversity of senders experienced by an individual. I call it local diversity.
By contrast, aggregate diversity is given by the total measure of senders which are active
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in equilibrium.4
The comparative-static analysis shows how changes in methods of impact generation or
radiation capacities aﬀect equilibrium signal strength, attention levels and the measure of
viable companies. As a main result, it is shown that an increase in the range of radiation,
allowing to companies a wider diﬀusion of their signals, may diminish the equilibrium set
of companies although each receiving subject has access to more varieties of senders than
before. In other words, aggregate diversity may decrease while higher local diversity is ex-
perienced. The reason is that diﬀerent local audiences turn into more homogeneous global
audiences. Natural applications of this result on the impact of extended radiation range
are technical innovations like the Internet. According to evidence reported by Graham
[2001], the number of sites that attract large shares of the time spent online substantially
dropped in recent years. This doesnt mean a reduction of information received by the
surfers, to the contrary. But more surfers focus on the same set of information sources.
Apart from technological possibilities, institutional restrictions can prevent senders from
expanding their range, for instance, to foreign audiences. Deregulation, in particular in-
ternational integration, is thus another example to which the comparative-static result on
the impact of an increase in the range of radiation can be applied.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 the general structure of attention
economies is formalized. Moreover, psychological evidence for the modelling of attention
and impact is provided. In Section 3 basic insights are illustrated by a simple example.
Section 4 determines equilibrium allocations of audiences to given families of senders. Sec-
4Usual economic analysis concentrates on the speciÞc choices out of the varieties that are available.
Under that focus, diversity is closely related to interpersonal diﬀerences in tastes and talents as empha-
sized in Rosen [2002] . The following analysis points to another important aspect of diversity. Items that
are not promoted powerfully enough are not part of the choice set. Equilibrium diversity is determined
by attention capacities and radiation power. Even ideas or products that would be appreciated by all
consumers  if they were aware of them  may not be viable since consumer attention is distracted to more
powerful signals. In personal relationships you can possibly force others to listen, but in an anonymous
market an audience of positive mass must be reached.
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tion 5 analyses the choice of signal strength in the contest for attention and characterizes
equilibrium levels of signal exposure and attention. In Section 6 the equilibrium family of
senders surviving the competition for attention is derived and comparative-static results
about equilibrium diversity are presented. Section 7 summarizes.
2 The structure of an attention economy
An attention economy consists of two types of agents: The companies sending signals to
earn attention, and the receivers exposed to the signals. The exogenous fundamentals of
the economy are the space of receivers together with their attention capacity and the space
of potential senders together with their technology. Senders can choose signal strength
and the audience on which the signals are targeted.
2.1 Senders and audiences
Let receivers be given by a set of subjects S. The potential audiences for a sender are given
by subsets5 A ⊂ S, for instance, the set of Internet users with certain surÞng characteristics
or the subjects on the mailing list of a marketing Þrm. There is no natural spatial structure
like in location models so that audiences could be represented as neighborhoods around
senders. The reason is that modern distribution of information typically doesnt involve
distance-dependent transportation costs like the distribution of commodities. Visitors of
web sites are scattered all over the world and mails can be ßexibly targeted. Therefore,
length or radius of some neighborhood around a sender cannot characterize the size of an
audience. A natural way to deal with this problem is to represent the space of receivers by
a measure space (S,A, µ), where A is a σ-Þeld of measurable subsets of S and µ is a Þnite
measure on A. Every element of A is a subset A ⊂ S representing a potential audience.
The size of the audience is given by the measure µ (A). The following analysis focuses on
contests for attention in competitive environments. One requirement for competition is
5⊂ denotes weak inclusion.
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that there are many potential audiences for whose attention the companies can compete.
In particular, it should be possible to pick also small sets of receivers. Formally, the
following divisibility assumption is made: For any A ∈ A with µ (A) > 0 and any constant
0 < c < µ (A) there exist B ∈ A so that µ (B) = c. (Take, for instance, the σ-Þeld of
Borel sets in a real interval S and the Lebesgue measure.)
Senders are the economic agents, for instance Þrms, who want to attract the attention
of audiences. Let L = (0, l] be the index set of potential senders in the economy. Thus,
t ∈ L is the name (logo) under which a company, a scientiÞc network or any other
attention-seeking agent conveys information (signals) to receivers. In general, not all
potential senders will be active. Actually, it is the purpose of the following analysis to
determine the subset T ⊂ L of companies surviving the competition for attention. Perfect
competition for attention requires that single companies have zero measure. It is assumed
that the potential sets of active senders are Lebesgue-measurable. That is, the space of
senders is given by (L,B,λ) where B,λ are the σ-Þeld of Borel sets in L and the Lebesgue
measure, respectively. Every element of B is a subset T ⊂ L representing a possible family
of active senders. λ (T ) measures its size.
Each potential sender t ∈ L is endowed with a radiation capacity. The radiation ca-
pacity is characterized by a real integrable function ρ : L → R++.6 ρ (t) describes the
maximal audience size (range) that can be addressed by company t. Senders are or-
dered according to their size, that is, ρ is non-increasing. In reality, the maximal size
of audiences that a company can handle depends on two factors: the available media
and the resources attributed to the management of receiver relationship. Obviously, new
media have dramatically changed the range of attention-seeking senders. Ceteris paribus,
a larger audience can be addressed through the Internet than by phone calls. In general,
such technological changes are exogenous to the single company. In the short run, also
the means for entertaining communication channels to receivers, for instance the organiza-
6R,R+,R++ denote the sets of real numbers, non-negative real numbers, positive real numbers, re-
spectively.
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tional infrastructure for maintaining mailing lists or evaluating the impact of distributed
information on the addressed audience, are Þxed. The following analysis assumes that
capacity ρ (t) is an exogenously given characteristic of sender t. The comparative-static
analysis of the impact of changes in ρ on receiver attention and the diversity of companies
will be an important part of the equilibrium analysis in Section 6.
Whereas range ρ is exogenous, senders can choose their signal strength. This is the
means by which a company attracts attention and which absorbs attention capacity of
receivers. For any given set T ∈ B of senders, signal strength is represented by a real
integrable function σT : T → R+. For every t ∈ T, σT (t) describes volume and intensity
of the information sent to the members of the audience of t, for instance, the number
of mails to clients per period, or the loudness or conspicuousness of the transmitted
signals. Production of signal strength is costly. Also the dissemination to an audience
has costs. They are independent of the size of the addressed audience, provided that
the audience can be handled with ts radiation capacity ρ (t) . This reßects the fact that
variable transportation costs are unimportant for distributing information with modern
technologies. Formally, for a company t the cost of exposing an audience A of measure
µ (A) ≤ ρ (t) to signal strength σ ≥ 0 are given by a function
Ct (σ, µ (A)) = ct (σ) , (2.1)
where ct is diﬀerentiable with c0t > 0, c
00
t ≥ 0, starting at ct (0) ≥ 0. This allows for
Þxed costs and falling average costs. They may arise from setting up signal production or
distribution capacity, i.e. the capacity to address audiences of size ρ (t). Note that signal
costs are allowed to be t-speciÞc.
2.2 Audience allocations
The interaction of senders and receivers depends on which subjects are attracted by
which companies. For characterizing the possible outcomes in an attention economy we
must describe the assignment of receivers to companies. From the perspective of a signal
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sending company the question is which audience is reached by its signals. From the side
of the receiving subjects the question is to which set of companies they pay attention. I
call the assignment of audiences to senders an audience allocation. Formally, an audience
allocation for a set of senders, T ∈ B, is given by a relation aT ⊂ T × S, where aT is
measurable B × A. (B × A is the product space with measure λ × µ.) If a pair (t, s) is
element of aT , then sender t addresses subject s under audience allocation aT . Thus, for
any t ∈ T , the section aT (t) : = {s ∈ S |(t, s) ∈ aT } deÞnes the audience of t. From the
perspective of a receiver s ∈ S, the section M (s, aT ) : = {t ∈ T |(t, s) ∈ aT } describes
the set of perceived companies. I call M (s, aT ) the membership of s under aT . Note that
aT ∈ B ×A implies that M (s, aT ) and aT (t) are measurable B and A, respectively. Not
all audience allocations are feasible. The audience assigned to an active company must
have positive measure and cannot be larger than the companys radiation capacity ρ (t).
Nor can it be larger than µ (S), the measure of all subjects in the economy. Since modern
technologies have a very large range I dont want to exclude the case that senders have the
capacity to cover the whole economy (i.e. ρ (t) ≥ µ (S)). In sum, an audience allocation
aT for T ∈ B is feasible under radiation capacity ρ if for all t ∈ T : 0 < µ (aT (t)) ≤ rt ,
where rt : = min {ρ (t) , µ (S)}. The fact that only the size of audiences is limited by the
radiation technology has far-reaching implications. It reßects that audiences of companies
need not be connected areas or neighborhoods in a geographical space. This would be the
case if, for instance, a sender would have a Þxed focus like a cone of light. In contrast to
this, according to the given notion of feasibility, companies can target their signals fully
ßexibly, provided the targeted audiences are not larger than what they can handle by
their given capacity. I think this is the adequate modelling of the media channels through
which modern companies disseminate and promote information to anonymous audiences.
Membership M (s, aT ) gives us a measure for local diversity under aT . In an economy
in which audience allocation aT is realized, λ (M (s, aT )) measures the variety of compa-
nies perceived by subject s. In contrast, T is the total variety of companies perceived
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somewhere in the economy. I call λ (T ) aggregate (or global) diversity under aT .7 It puts
an upper limit to local diversity. If for many subjects λ (M (s, aT )) is small compared
to λ (T ), then the variety of companies perceived by diﬀerent subjects is relatively het-
erogeneous across subjects. If for all s local diversity coincides with aggregate diversity,
every subject experiences the same set of companies. For instance, if T is the set of active
scientiÞc networks in the world and each subject of the scientiÞc community is a member
of all t ∈ T , then local diversity is equal to global diversity. There is a uniform interna-
tional scientiÞc community paying attention to the same set of paper series etc. If many
networks t ∈ T have only local membership, then local diversity perceived by a member
of a local scientiÞc community is small compared to the global diversity experienced by a
subject moving around through all local communities.
2.3 Attention, signal exposure and impact
The basic characteristic of subjects in their role as receivers in an attention economy is
their attention capacity. An agent may be in a more or less attentive state. If (s)he is
more attentive (s)he processes received information more carefully. On the one side, this
capacity depends on individual psychological factors, which can vary from individual to
individual since people are heterogeneous with respect to their abilities to concentrate.
(This ability may be the result of some self-management regarding a persons mental
resources or time.) On the other side, the attentiveness of an individual with given
psychological characteristics is also inßuenced by the strength and volume of signals to
which she or he is exposed. Any given audience allocation aT with signal strength σT
implies for a subject s ∈ S a certain signal exposure, namely:
τ s =
Z
M(s,aT )
σTdλ. (2.2)
7By extending the notion to sets of subjects A ∈ A, we can describe the variety of companies perceived
in A by M (A, aT ) : = {t ∈ T |(t, s) ∈ aT for some s ∈ A}. Then, M (S, aT ) = T for any feasible aT . Note
that for all A for which M (A, aT ) is measurable, λ (M (A, aT )) can be seen as diversity function in the
sense of Nehring and Puppe [2002] , since M (A, aT ) = {t |aT (t) ∩A 6= ®} and λ (M (A, aT )) =
R
M
dλ.
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From the perspective of a sender t, grabbing for attention with strength σT (t) , the
question is how much attention a subject exposed to τ s pays to the signals coming from
t?
The psychological literature on attention has extensively studied the limitations in
perceptual systems (see Pashler [1998] for a review) or more generally in mental capacity
(Kahneman [1973]). For the purpose of this paper it is necessary to translate the Þndings
of this literature into a formal model which is simple enough to serve as a building block
for general equilibrium analysis. Three general features can be identiÞed:
First, stimulus-processing is subject to capacity limitations in the sense that the
speed or eﬃciency of the processing is reduced when other stimuli are processed at the
same time (Pashler [1998] , p. 101). Kahneman [1973] speaks of the spare capacity
available for processing a signal. This suggests that the extent to which σ sent by t is
processed by a receiver s depends on how much of the receivers capacity is absorbed by
all other signals τ s to which s is exposed.8 We can represent this by a measurable bounded
function ν : S×R+ → R++, where ν (s, τ s) is the spare capacity left when signal exposure
of s is τ s. For each s ∈ S, the function ν (s, .) models the attention capacity of subject s.
It assigns to each level τ s the attention level υ = ν (s, τ s) available for further signal σ
when s is already exposed to τ s.9 It is important to keep in mind that attention capacities
ν (s, .) are exogenous individual characteristics, whereas attention levels υ depend on the
economic environment, τ s, which is exogenous to the single agent but endogenous in the
economic equilibrium.
Second, attention is not necessarily a scarce resource. Pashler [1998] : ... capacity
limits do exist beyond a certain point; with stimulus load below this level, processing
appears to be ... free of capacity limits (p. 162). In particular, as is emphasized by Kah-
neman, increasing signal exposure mobilizes mental eﬀort. Thus, spare capacity ν (s, τ s)
8Note that a single sender t has zero measure and therefore no inßuence on τs. Formally, τs =R
M(s,aT )
σT dλ =
R
M(s,aT 0 )
σT 0dλ for T 0 = T − {t} and aT (t0) = aT 0 (t0) for all t0 ∈ T 0.
9In Kahnemans dual-task framework, τs corresponds to the primary task, and σ to the probe signal.
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may even rise with τ s  subjects wake up. But at high levels of stimulation, there is
crowding of signals. Additional processing requirements cannot fully be met by addition-
ally mobilized eﬀorts.10 As a consequence, spare capacity ν (s, τ s) declines when τ s rises.
I summarize this psychological fact by the following assumption.
Assumption SA (Scarce Attention). Attention capacities represented by ν satisfy SA if
for all s ∈ S there is a threshold τ+s ≥ 0 so that ν (s, τ 0s) < ν (s, τ s) if τ 0s > τ s ≥ τ+s .
The assumption states in a formal way that attention is scarce in an information-rich
economy.11 Information-rich means that signal exposure has reached a certain threshold.
Scarce attention means that there is crowding of signals so that higher signal exposure τ s
implies less attention left for additional signals σ. Note that the threshold τ+s above which
increasing signal exposure is harmful for a subjects level of attention can be diﬀerent for
diﬀerent subjects.
There remains one element to be speciÞed. By deÞnition, in an attention economy
companies send signals to earn the attention of receivers. The reason is that it is proÞtable
to have impact, i.e., to be on the subjects mind. A third psychological fact helps us to
relate attention to impact. Attended events are more likely to be perceived consciously,
and more likely to be perceived in detail. They have a higher probability of eliciting
and controlling responses, and they are more likely to be stored in permanent memory
(Kahneman [1973] , p. 68). Thus, if we ask to which extent a senders signal σ get through
and inßuence a receiver, the answer is that this depends on the attention level υ devoted
to σ by the receiver. This suggests the following model for the sender-receiver relation:
The (economic value of the) impact of a sender t on a receiver with attention level υ (> 0)
is a non-negative real function zt (σ, υ) with zt (0, υ) = 0, which increases in σ and, for
10See Kahneman [1973] , in particular pp. 13-17, 33-37 and 199-202.
11SA puts no restriction on the speciÞc shape of ν. For instance, ν may decline very sharply if changes
in aT ,σT lead to an increase in signal exposure. Subjects possibly concentrate on a certain amount of
information and neglect the rest more or less.
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σ > 0, also in υ.12 It is assumed that zt is measurable and bounded. (Later, for some
results, additional concavity and diﬀerentiability properties will be imposed.) zt describes
how signal strength and attention generate impact. Attention level υ is the only receiver
characteristic which matters. There is no personalized interaction and apart from their
attentiveness receivers are exchangeable. Note however that impact function zt can vary
across companies. The same signal strength may generate diﬀerent impact for diﬀerent
types of senders.13
2.4 Behavior and equilibrium
Receivers react to signal exposure according to their exogenously given attention capacity
ν. In the contest for attention, the active role is played by the senders. Their objective is
to achieve maximal impact  net of the cost of attention grabbing.
Since the signals of company t reach all members of audience aT (t) , the value of total
impact of t ∈ T under aT ,σT is given by14
Vt (aT ,σT ) =
Z
aT (t)
zt (σT (t) , ν (s, τ s)) dµ (s) . (2.3)
Combining (2.1) and (2.3) we get for the net value of impact achieved by an active
sender t ∈ T in an economy with audience allocation aT and signal strength σT :
V nt (aT , σT ) = Vt (aT , σT )− ct (σT (t)) . (2.4)
Sender t can choose two kinds of actions to maximize V nt . First, t can choose sig-
nal strength σT (t) . This is a standard cost-beneÞt calculation analyzed in Section 5.
12Since υ = ν (s, τs) is the spare capacity left for σ under signal exposure τs, we have zt (σ, υ) =
zt (σ, ν (s, τs)) . Thus, Assumption SA is equivalent to saying that in an information-rich economy an
increase in τs reduces impact zt by crowding out ts signals.
13σ comprises only that dimension of transmitted information which absorbs attention capacity. Any
other aspects, which may be relevant for impact, for instance the used medium or the clarity of ts
presentation, are captured by zt.
14Since ν and zt are non-negative, measurable and bounded, the integral exists (note µ (S) <∞).
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Secondly, t can select its audience aT (t) . The selection of the audience is based on the
following reasoning: As long as there is a choice between more or less attentive receivers,
the impact of information can be increased by targeting it on subjects with higher atten-
tion.15 This chasing for attentive audiences is analyzed in Section 4. For a given set of
active companies, an equilibrium is reached if a feasible audience allocation is realized,
all companies choose their optimal signal strength and no company has an incentive to
retarget its signals to more attentive audiences. The equilibrium set of active Þrms is
determined by the zero-proÞt condition (Section 6). Only those companies survive which
achieve a non-negative value of impact (net of the cost for generating the impact).
The general analysis of audience choice and its consequences for equilibrium requires
some technical apparatus. Before turning to the general results, I will illustrate basic
insights in a simple representative agent framework neglecting the problem of audience
selection.
3 A simple example
Suppose that attention capacities ν are identical for all s ∈ S and given by the function
ν (s, τ s) = τ
−β
s ,β > 0. Moreover, assume that signal exposure is identical across receivers,
i.e. τ s = τ for all s. Then, all subjects are equally attentive with attention level
υ = τ−β. (3.1)
For instance, τ can be the number of proposals brought to our attention and υ is the
attention (time, processing quality) we spend on each of them.
15This requires that companies are able to observe the attention level of subjects. In a strict sense this
is only possible with direct attention-monitoring methods evaluating brain waves or eye-ball movements.
Although such methods exist and are further developed  Davenport and Beck [2001, p. 49] speak of
the Wireem up principle  observable proxies for the attention of audiences are more realistic. Media
watch, download statistics, speed and frequency of response, self-reported data on attentiveness are
examples.
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Next, suppose that all potential senders have identical radiation range ρ (t) = ρ and are
identical also in all other respects. Let their impact function be given by z (σ, υ) = συ.
That means, a sender which sends σ proposals to a subject that spends attention υ
on each proposal attracts συ of the subjects resources. Since each sender can reach
r = min {ρ, µ (S)} subjects, total impact of a sender is V = rσυ. Finally, let costs be
c (σ) = 1
2
σ2 + c0. Then, each active sender chooses optimal signal strength σ∗ = rυ and
the zero-proÞt condition reads:
V ∗ =
1
2
r2υ2 − c0 = 0. (3.2)
If λ (T ) senders are active, the aggregate level of signal emission is λ (T ) rσ∗ =
λ (T ) r2υ. In equilibrium, this must be equal to the aggregate volume of signals received
by all receivers together. Since each receiver is exposed to τ signals and µ (S) is the
measure of receivers in the economy, this equilibrium condition gives us
τ =
λ (T ) r2υ
µ (S)
. (3.3)
System (3.1)  (3.3) deÞnes the equilibrium values of attention υ, of signal exposure τ
and aggregate diversity λ (T ) of active senders. Moreover, local diversity is given by the
fact that (2.2) reduces to τ s = λ (M (s, aT )) rυ, since σT (t) = σ∗ = rυ in the considered
example. Combining this with (3.3), we have
λ (M (s, aT )) =
λ (T ) r
µ (S)
. (3.4)
The equilibrium values depend, apart from the subjective characteristic β, on the size
of the economy µ (S) and on the information technology to which senders have access.
This technology is reßected in cost c (σ) as well as in radiation range ρ. The latter only
matters if ρ < µ (S) . In this case, we get from (3.1)  (3.4): υ =
√
2c0/ρ, σ
∗ =
√
2c0,
τ = ρ1/β (2c0)
− 1
2β and
λ (T ) =
µ (S) ρ(1−β)/β
c
(3.5)
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λ (M (s, aT )) =
ρ1/β
c
(3.6)
with c ≡ (2c0)
1+β
2β .
Thus, if technical progress allows to grab for attention in a wider range ρ, aggregate di-
versity of information suppliers λ (T ) decreases (increases) if β > 1 (β < 1, respectively) .
In contrast, local diversity, perceived by single subjects, increases unambiguously. Obvi-
ously, this simple example serves only illustrative purposes. With other functional forms
also aggregate diversity may rise. Nor can a decline in local diversity be excluded. How-
ever, as (3.4) shows, for r = ρ < µ (S) , declining local diversity is only possible if λ (T )
drops highly elastically when senders are getting access to a technology with wider range
ρ. I will come back on this point at the end of Section 6, where further comparative-static
results are addressed including the eﬀects of international integration.
The presented example not only assumes very simple and speciÞc functional forms.
More importantly, it disregards the senders audience choice and the question how an equi-
librium audience allocation aT is reached. Identical signal exposure τ s = τ was imposed
by assumption. This and the assumption of identical receiver and sender characteristics
allowed us to determine the measure of T and M (s, aT ) without any knowledge about
aT . In fact, however, as shown by (2.2), signal exposure τ s depends on aT , where aT is
the result of the senders attempt to direct their messages to the most attentive receivers.
So we have do analyze the audience choice before we can say something deÞnite.
The further analysis proceeds as follows: In a Þrst step, the properties of equilibrium
audience allocations are determined for a given set of companies T with signal strength
σT . It is not meaningful to look for a unique sender-receiver assignment aT , since any
permutation of aT that leaves signal exposure, attention and impact unchanged is also
an equilibrium. The question is whether we can establish nonetheless unique equilibria
in the sense that attention levels, signal exposure, impact and diversity are uniquely
determined by the fundamentals of the economy. The next section shows that, under
quite general conditions, in any equilibrium allocation aT for a given set T with strength
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σT , the attention level of subjects is uniquely determined by aggregate signal emissionX :
=
R
T
rtσT (t) dt. In a further step, I analyze, for a given set of senders T with aggregate
signal level X, the optimal choice of signal strength σ∗t of a single sender t ∈ T. Then I
determine the equilibrium values of X, σT , which are consistent with this choice. In the
third step, I determine the size of equilibrium set T ∗ of companies which achieve suﬃcient
impact to survive in an attention economy and describe the characteristics of companies
in T ∗. The results are used to resume the comparative-static analysis of the eﬀects of
technical change and international integration on sender diversity and receiver attention.
4 Equilibrium allocation of audiences
Given a set of senders, T ∈ B, with signal strength σT . Each company t ∈ T can reach
an audience of measure µ (aT (t)) ≤ rt. Depending on which feasible audience allocation
is actually realized, total impact of t is Vt (aT , σT ) . Suppose that there is another feasible
audience allocation a0T under which company t would achieve a higher impact. Then t
clearly would prefer a0T to aT . However, a single company hasnt the power to decide about
which audience allocation is realized in the economy. It can only chose its own audience,
i.e. the set of receivers A ∈ A on which the produced volume of signals, σT (t), is targeted.
Thus, for t ∈ T, a deviation from an audience allocation aT to another audience allocation
a0T is feasible if a
0
T results from aT by exchanging aT (t) through a
0
T (t) and leaving all other
audience assignments unchanged. This leads to the following deÞnition of an equilibrium
allocation of audiences.
DeÞnition 1 (Equilibrium audience allocation). For T ∈ B with σT , let aT be a feasible
audience allocation. (i) An audience allocation a0T is a feasible deviation from aT for
t ∈ T, if a0T is a feasible audience allocation and a0T (t0) = aT (t0) for all t0 ∈ T − {t} . (ii)
aT is an equilibrium audience allocation if for no t ∈ T there is a feasible deviation a0T
from aT with Vt (a0T ,σT ) > Vt (aT ,σT ) .
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Whenever a company has an opportunity to increase its impact by retargeting its sig-
nals, the company will use the opportunity. It will skip less attentive receivers and use
the radiation capacity to address subjects on which the produced signals have a higher
impact. If audiences are allocated to senders in a way that oﬀers no such opportunities,
no company is interested in changing the audience allocation. If subjects have very het-
erogeneous attention capacities, it cannot be excluded that some of them are not covered
at all, that is, no company targets its signals on them. Others may be fully covered by all
companies. Let U := {s |M (s, aT ) = ∅} , and F := {s |M (s, aT ) = T } be the (possibly
empty) sets of uncovered and fully covered subjects, respectively. The following proposi-
tion characterizes the attention levels of covered and uncovered subjects in an equilibrium
audience allocation.
Proposition 1 . For T ∈ B with σT > 0 (i.e. σT (t) > 0 for all t ∈ T ), let aT be a
feasible audience allocation.
If aT is an equilibrium audience allocation, the following conditions hold: (a) For all
t ∈ T : ν (s0, τ s0) ≤ ν (s, τ s) for almost all s0 ∈ U, s ∈ aT (t) . (b) ν (s, τ s) ≤ ν (s0, τ s0) ,
for almost all s ∈ S − F, s0 ∈ F. (c) For υ ∈ R++, let S−υ := {s |ν (s, τ s) < υ} , S+υ :=
{s |ν (s, τ s) ≥ υ} . For all t ∈ T : If µ (aT (t) ∩ S−υ ) 6= 0, then µ (S+υ − aT (t)) = 0. (d) For
all t ∈ T : µ (aT (t)) = rt.
If aT satisÞes conditions (c) and (d) then aT is an equilibrium audience allocation.
Proof. Appendix
The proposition provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an equilibrium. An
immediate consequence of the suﬃcient conditions is that any audience allocation with
equalized attention levels and fully utilized radiation range is an equilibrium.
Corollary 1 . aT is an equilibrium audience allocation if ν (s, τ s) = ν (s0, τ s0), for almost
all s, s0 ∈ S, and µ (aT (t)) = rt for all t ∈ T.
Proof. Equal attention levels imply condition (c), and (d) holds by assumption.
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The necessary conditions imply that, apart from extreme cases, attention levels must
be equal, as the following discussion of conditions (a) - (d) shows.
Condition (a) says that only the least attentive subjects are possibly not addressed by
any company, that is, are uncovered by T. Since they would pay less attention than other
audiences, no company would wish to retarget its signals on them. In contrast, condition
(b) deals with subjects which are in the focus of all companies. Such receivers, if there
are any, must have a very high attention capacity. Despite full exposure (to all t ∈ T ),
their attention level is at least as high as the attention level of subjects which are not
fully covered by T (i.e. for which M (s, aT ) is a proper subset of T ). Condition (c) is the
most interesting one. Any company which has people with relatively low attention level
among its receivers (i.e. for which µ (aT (t) ∩ S−υ ) 6= 0) almost surely has also all receivers
with higher attention in its audience (µ (S+υ − aT (t)) = 0). Only a company that has
exhausted all subjects with relatively high attention is willing to target its signals also on
less attentive receivers. The alternative would be to leave part of the radiation capacity
unused. But this would be no equilibrium, as stated by (d), since additional receivers, if
they are feasible, always increase the total impact of a sender. If T contains enough small
companies (i.e. ρ (t) is small relative to the measure µ (S) of receivers), their chase after
attentive audiences tends to equalize attention levels. To see this consider an audience
allocation with two subject pools A,A0 ∈ A. Some companies target their signals on A,
others on A0 or on both sets. Small companies with ρ (t) < min {µ (A) , µ (A0)} can fully
utilize their capacity by concentrating on one set. As long as attention levels are high in
one set and low in the other, small companies can always switch to the more attentive
subjects. If there are many such companies, signal exposure and attention levels change.
The retargeting process only stops when attention levels in the two sets are equal or if
all companies have switched to the more attentive audience. But the latter implies that
this audience consists of an elite whose attention capacity is so high that they process
any volume of signals better than others. The following corollary proves this intuitive
argument. (A set eU ∈ A is said to be almost uncovered if µ³eU ∩ aT (t)´ = 0 for all
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t ∈ T. And eF ∈ A is almost fully covered if µ³ eF − aT (t)´ = 0 for any t ∈ T 16.)
Corollary 2 If heterogeneity of radiation capacities is limited, in particular if ρ (t) =
ρ (t0) for all t ∈ T, then in any equilibrium allocation aT one of the following three condi-
tions must be satisÞed: (a) ν (s, τ s) = ν (s0, τ s0) almost everywhere or (b) there exists an
almost fully covered set of receivers with positive measure or (c) there is a set of almost
uncovered subjects with positive measure.
Proof. Appendix.
The restriction on ρ (t) used in the proof is that either all senders have a radiation
range exceeding a certain size or all of them are smaller than this size. This is a suﬃcient
condition for the result, not a necessary one. The corollary makes no restriction concerning
heterogeneity of attention capacities. In sum, under quite general circumstances, in an
attention economy in which all subjects are covered by some but not by all senders,
attention levels are equal in an equilibrium allocation of audiences. Obviously, attention
levels can be equal in other circumstances as well, for example, if all subjects have identical
attention capacities and are fully covered. The further analysis concentrates on audience
allocations with equalized attention levels. The next corollary summarizes the conditions
which guarantee the existence of an equilibrium with equal attention levels.
Corollary 3 . For T ∈ B with σT , an equilibrium audience allocation with equal attention
levels exists if the following conditions hold: There is an integrable function τ (s) : S → R+
which solves (i) ν (s, τ (s)) = ν (s0, τ (s0)) almost everywhere. There are decompositions
{Ts |s ∈ S } , {St |t ∈ T } of T and S, respectively, satisfying (ii)
R
Ts
σT (t) dt = τ (s) , (iii)
µ (St) = rt and (iv) Ts = {t |(t, s) ∈ a} , St = {s |(t, s) ∈ a} for some a ∈ B ×A.
16Note that set U of uncovered subjects is also almost uncovered. But there may be almost uncovered
sets eU (⊃U) with µ³eU´ > 0 for µ (U) = 0. The reason is that the union S
t∈T
³eU∩aT (t)´ over an
uncountable T may have positive measure even if µ
³eU∩aT (t)´ = 0 for any t. In an analogous way,
µ (F ) > 0 implies µ
³ eF´ > 0 but not vice versa.
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Proof. Apply Corollary 1 to a.
The corollary states two types of requirements  economic restrictions regarding het-
erogeneity andmathematical requirements concerning divisibility and measurability. They
interact in a diﬃcult way. Heterogeneity of receivers is no problem as long as there is
a suﬃciently rich sender structure so that senders can be assigned to receivers in such
a way that signal load τ (s) is distributed across subjects according to their capacities.
For instance, if senders are identical, condition (ii) reduces to λ (Ts) σ = τ (s) . Then we
have only the divisibility and measurability problem: Are there decompositions of T and
S with λ (Ts) = τ (s) /σ and λ (St) = r which are sections of a measurable a? On the
other hand, if receivers are homogeneous, condition (i) is trivially fulÞlled for τ (s) = τ .
Thus, the question that remains is: Is there a decomposition satisfying (iii) and (iv) so
that
R
Ts
σT (t) = τ for some τ > 0? If also senders are identical, any aT ∈ B × A with
µ (aT (t)) = r and λ (M (s, aT )) = λ(M (s0, aT )) is an equilibrium audience allocation.
The following example describes a large class of economies with heterogeneous senders,
in which divisibility is no problem and an equilibrium audience allocation with equal
attention levels can be constructed explicitly.
Example 1 . For T, σT > 0, let heterogeneity of senders be restricted by the assumption
that there is a Þnite partition Tk ∈ B, k = 1, ..., K, 0 < λ (Tk) < λ (T ) with ρ (t) = ρk
and σT (t) = σk for t ∈ Tk. Sender capacities satisfy the following divisibility condition:
Senders in class k either cover all subjects (i.e. ρk ≥ µ (S)) or the subject space can
be properly divided among them (i.e. µ (S) /ρk is an integer). Moreover, suppose that
receivers attention capacities are given by a function f (τ s) = ν (s, τ s) almost everywhere.
Fact 1. For attention economies satisfying the properties of Example 1, an equilibrium
audience allocation exists with λ (M (s, aT )) =
P
k
ρkλ (Tk) /µ (S) , τ s = τ and ν (s, τ s) =
f (τ ) , almost everywhere, where τ =
P
k
σkrkλ (Tk) /µ (S) , rk = min {ρk, µ (S)} .
Proof. Appendix.
22
In the proof of Fact 1 a concrete audience allocation is constructed satisfying the
properties of equilibrium. Other audience allocations can fulÞl these properties as well.
However, the construction of the equilibrium audience allocation suggests that in any
equilibrium audience allocation with equal attention levels, the equilibrium attention level
is uniquely determined by average signal emission
P
k
σkrkλ (Tk) /µ (S) . (Note that σkrk is
signal emission by sender k who spreads σk over range rk. And
P
k
σkrkλ (Tk) is aggregate
signal emission.) The following proposition shows that under SA this is generally the case
for equilibrium audience allocations with equalized attention levels.
Proposition 2 . For T ∈ B, σT > 0 deÞne X :=
R
T
rtσT (t) dt. Under SA, there exists
a decreasing real function υ (·) so that for any equilibrium audience allocation aT with
τ s ≥ τ+s for almost all s the following holds: If attention levels are equal under aT , then
they are given by υ (X) (i.e. ν (s, τ s) = υ (X) almost everywhere)17.
Proof. Appendix.
Assumption SA and τ s ≥ τ+s mean that signal exposure in the economy is suﬃciently
strong to make scarcity of attention relevant. Condition τ s ≥ τ+s is the formal expression
of what Simon called information-rich world. SA states that in an information-rich
economy there is indeed a new scarcity problem, namely scarcity of attention. Thus,
whereas Proposition 1 and its corollaries apply to any economy, Proposition 2 character-
izes attention levels in an information-rich economy with scarcity of attention. In such an
economy, in any equilibrium audience allocation with equalized attention levels the equi-
librium level of attention is uniquely determined. That means, we need not be concerned
about multiple equilibria. The equilibrium attention level of receivers is given by υ (X)
17Like in all other statements µ (S) is Þxed throughout the analysis. If µ (S) changes, a diﬀerent
function υ (·) is relevant. In general, the comparative-static eﬀects of changes in µ (S) are ambiguous.
But if attention capacities are identical as in Example 1, equal attention levels imply τs = τ = X/µ (S) .
Then the equilibrium attention level is a function of X/µ (S) . At the end of this paper this fact is used
to illustrate possible consequences of international integration in an attention economy (see discussion of
Fact 3).
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which is independent of the signal strength σT (t) of a single sender (λ ({t}) = 0) . Hence,
each sender t ∈ T can take the attention level of its receivers as given when deciding about
signal strength. This decision and the implied equilibrium signal strength are analyzed in
the next section.
5 Competition for attention and equilibrium signal
exposure
The question solved so far was: Given a set of companies T with signal strength σT ,
what are the properties of equilibrium audience allocations under T, σT . This leaves open
the questions: (i) Which sets of companies are equilibrium sets, and (ii) which signal
strength do companies choose to have an optimal impact on their audience? In this
section the second question is answered. Given an audience allocation aT for T ∈ B, what
are equilibrium choices σT (t) , t ∈ T?
In an attention economy, the essential performance measure is impact. According to
(2.4), the net value of impact of t sending with strength σ ∈ R+ is
V nt =
Z
aT (t)
zt (σ, ν (s, τ s)) dµ (s)− ct (σ) . (5.1)
Signal strength σ is optimal for t under aT , σT if V nt reaches a maximum at σ. A single
company, having zero measure, has no inßuence on τ s. Thus, any t ∈ T takes ν (s, τ s) as
given when deciding about its signal strength.
DeÞnition 2 (Equilibrium signal strength). For T ∈ B, let aT be a feasible audience
allocation. (i) σT is an equilibrium under aT if, for all t ∈ T,σT (t) is optimal under
aT , σT . (ii) aT ,σT is an equilibrium for T, if aT is an equilibrium audience allocation for
T, σT , and σT is an equilibrium under aT.
As shown in Proposition 2 under quite general assumptions, in an equilibrium audience
allocation aT with signal strength σT attention levels of subjects are given by a decreasing
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function ν (s, τ s) = υ (X) of aggregate signal emission X. Moreover, µ (aT (t)) = rt in an
equilibrium audience allocation. Thus, the net value of total impact which is achieved by
t ∈ T is given by
V nt = rtzt (σT (t) , υ (X))− ct (σT (t)) . (5.2)
According to (5.2), expanding signal strength σT (t) has a positive eﬀect on company
ts reception for any givenX. But if a positive mass of companies increases signal strength,
then X increases, which has an external eﬀect on other companies. Under the assump-
tions of Proposition 2, υ (X) decreases in X so that the external eﬀect is negative.18 t
ignores this eﬀect when deciding about the optimal σT (t) . Determining equilibrium signal
strength therefore requires two steps. First, one has to clarify which σT (t) is optimal for
individual companies t ∈ T if aggregate signal emission is X. Second, one has to look for
an equilibrium which satisÞes X =
R
T
rtσT (t) dt.
The choice of optimal strength σ is a standard optimization problem. Since the in-
novation of this paper lies elsewhere, I want to keep this problem simple enough to ap-
ply diﬀerential calculus for deriving comparative-static results about the choice of signal
strength. So far only measurability and boundedness of impact function zt (σ, υ) was
required. Moreover, zt (0, υ) = 0, zt increasing in σ and, for σ > 0, increasing in υ. From
now on it is assumed that zt is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and satisÞes the following
concavity property:19
∂2zt
∂σ2
< 0,
∂2zt
∂υ∂σ
≥ 0. (5.3)
Moreover, lim
σ→0
∂zt
∂σ
=∞ and lim
σ→∞
∂zt
∂σ
= 0.
18The idea to internalize such negative external eﬀects is probably the reason why people have proposed
to impose a price on sending electronic mails. See Kraut, Sunder, Morris, Telang, Filer and Cronin [2002]
for laboratory experiments on such proposals.
19These are suﬃcient conditions guaranteeing generally the existence of a positive optimal signal
strength with comparative-static properties as required for an equilibrium. They need not hold in concrete
examples, in which the solution can be calculated explicitly.
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With this speciÞcation the outcome of the optimization of signal strength is a monoto-
nous function of audience size and attention level.
Proposition 3 . For T, σT let aT be a feasible audience allocation with ν (s, τ s) = υ
almost everywhere. If cost and impact functions satisfy (2.1) and (5.3), respectively,
then: (a) A companys optimal signal strength is given by a diﬀerentiable function σ∗t
(µ (aT (t)) , υ) with ∂σ∗t/∂µ > 0 and ∂σ
∗
t/∂υ ≥ 0. (b) For all t ∈ T, the maximal net-value
of impact is given by a diﬀerentiable increasing function of µ (aT (t)) and υ.
Proof. Appendix.
According to Part (a), larger companies send more strongly. According to (b), they
are also better oﬀ. Moreover, any company is better oﬀ when attention is high. But no
company is inclined to reduce signal strength when υ is high. To the contrary, ∂σ∗/∂υ ≥
0, i.e. senders tend to increase their attention grabbing eﬀort if facing more attentive
receivers..
The next task is to characterize equilibrium signal strength. For this purpose two
further purely technical restrictions have to be imposed on the functions representing
attention capacities, signal impacts and costs. First, it is assumed that the space of
receivers (S,A, µ) is given by a real interval S with A the σ-Þeld of Borel sets in S and
µ the Lebesgue measure. Moreover, it is assumed that for all s the function representing
attention capacities, ν (s, τ) , is diﬀerentiable with respect to τ . Secondly, it is assumed
that impact and cost functions vary across t in a measurable way. Formally, for all σ, υ,
the derivatives ∂zt (σ, υ) /∂σ and c0t (σ) are measurable functions of t. (Note that this is
trivially fulÞlled if zt, ct are identical for all t.) These properties guarantee the following
facts which are useful for the derivation of equilibrium signal strength.
Lemma 1 . Function υ (·) in Proposition 2 is diﬀerentiable (dυ/dX < 0) . Function
σT (t) := σ
∗
t (µ (aT (t)) , υ) of optimal signal strength, derived in Proposition 3, is mea-
surable.
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Proof. Appendix.
With this preparation, equilibrium signal strength can be determined as follows: In an
equilibrium audience allocation µ (aT (t)) = rt. Thus, according to Proposition 3, optimal
strength of t ∈ T is given by σ∗t (rt, υ) . Since rt is an exogenous characteristic of t, argu-
ment rt can be omitted without loss of information. Thus, in the further exposition I write
σ∗t (υ) instead of σ
∗
t (rt, υ) . Equilibrium signal strength σT must satisfy two conditions: It
must be consistent with the optimal choice of individual companies, i.e.:
σT (t) = σ
∗
t (υ) (5.4)
for all t ∈ T. And σT must be consistent with attention level υ. If the assumptions of
Proposition 2 are fulÞlled, this attention level is given by a decreasing function υ (X) , i.e.
υ = υ (X) with X =
Z
T
rtσT (t) dt. (5.5)
(Lemma 1 guarantees that σ∗t is measurable so that the integral deÞning X exists.) Com-
bining the two conditions (5.4) and (5.5), we obtain the equation
X = Z (X, T, rT ) (5.6)
with Z (X, T, rT ) :=
R
T
rtσ
∗
t (υ (X)) dt ≥ 0 and rT denoting the function on T assigning to
each t ∈ T range rt. According to Lemma 1, dυ/dX < 0. Since σ∗t is diﬀerentiable and
non-decreasing in υ, ∂Z/∂X ≤ 0 so that equation (5.6) deÞnes for each T, rT a unique
equilibrium level X∗ [T, rT ] of aggregate signal emission. Together with (5.4) and (5.5),
this deÞnes also a unique attention level υ∗T := υ (X
∗ [T, rT ]) and a unique equilibrium
signal strength σ∗T (t) := σ
∗
t (υ
∗
T ) . The following theorem summarizes this important result.
Theorem 1 . Under SA, in any equilibrium aT , σT for T ∈ B, in which attention levels
are equalized and τ s ≥ τ+s for almost all s, equilibrium signal strength σ∗T and equilibrium
attention level υ∗T are uniquely determined by T and rT .
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Proof. Main text.
Assumption SA and τ s ≥ τ+s mean that receivers are strained by the prevailing signal
exposure, so that their attention capacity is decreasing in the relevant range. In other
words, signal exposure is strong enough to make the economy information rich and atten-
tion scarce. Uniqueness of σ∗T and υ
∗
T allows us to derive comparative-static properties of
equilibria in an attention economy. Regarding the attention level induced by a given set
of active senders we have the following result.
Theorem 2 . Under the assumptions of Theorem 1: If ρ (t) < µ (S) and ρ (t) increases
to eρ (t) > ρ (t) on a measurable subset T0 ⊂ T, 0 < λ (T0) , then equilibrium attention υ∗T
declines.
Proof. Appendix.
The theorem means that in an information-rich economy expansion of ρ aggravates
the problem of scarce attention. Two channels are eﬀective. An increase in the range
of radiation, allowing a wider diﬀusion of signals, induces companies to increase their
signal strength in competing for attention. The reason is that diﬀusion of signals within
the feasible range has zero marginal cost so that the production of impact by addressing
signals on audiences is subject to economies of scale. At the same time, there is a second
eﬀect leading to higher signal exposure of subjects even without such economies of scale
at the company level. Any given signal strength reaches more subjects when the radiation
range of a company is extended. As long as the set of companies doesnt change, this
necessarily means more overlap among audiences. For instance, if a national scientiÞc
network extends its range to the international level it has to address subjects belonging
to other national or international communities. As a consequence, these subjects will be
exposed to more publications. If signal exposure was high before, relative to threshold τ+s
deÞned by SA, then the increased volume of signals will be perceived with less attention.
Of course, the described phenomenon isnt speciÞc to scientiÞc communities. Info-stress
28
and attention deÞcit are not uncommon. According to Theorem 2, a responsible economic
factor is the possibility to address larger audiences.
The extension of the range of one company may wipe out other companies so that T,
which up to now has been taken as given, changes. This brings us to the question of how
equilibrium diversity is determined in an attention economy. This question is answered
in Section 6. Before turning to this section, I want to illustrate Theorem 1 and Theorem
2 by the following example.
Example 2 . Suppose that T can be partitioned in K measurable sets T1, . . . , TK with
ρ (t) = ρk for t ∈ T, where the divisibility condition of Example 1 is satisÞed. Like
in Example 1 let ν (s, τ s) be given by a non-increasing function f (τ s) . Moreover, for
t ∈ Tk, ct (σ) = ck1σ + ck0 for some constants ck0 ≥ 0, 0 < ck1 < rk and, for σ > 1,
zt (σ, υ) = gk (υ) ln σ + hk (υ) , where gk (υ) ≥ 1, hk (υ) ≥ 0 for υ > 0, and g0k ≥ 0, h0k ≥ 0
with one inequality holding strictly. (For σ ≤ 1, zt (σ, υ) = 0 is assumed.)
Fact 2. For any T satisfying the properties of Example 2, (a) an equilibrium aT ,σT
with equalized attention levels exists, and (b) in any such equilibrium σ∗k = rkgk (υ
∗) /ck1,
υ∗ = f (τ ∗) where signal exposure of subjects is given by a function τ∗ (λ (T1) , . . . , λ (TK) ,
ρ1, . . . , ρK) with ∂τ
∗/∂λ (Tk) > 0 and ∂τ ∗/∂ρk > 0 if ρk < µ (S) , k = 1, . . . , K.
Proof. Appendix.
6 Viability and equilibrium diversity in an attention
economy
The notion of a competitive environment requires: Agents must be viable, and free entry is
allowed. In an attention economy, in which it is vital to attract attention, a natural notion
of viability is that companies achieve a non-negative net-value V nt ≥ 0 from sending costly
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signals for having impact on audiences. Free entry means that companies can participate
in the contest for attention if they want.
For any single company the situation looks as follows: Given a set T ∈ B of active
companies, a feasible audience allocation aT and some signal strength σT > 0, the net-
value of impact achieved by t ∈ T under aT ,σT is V nt (aT ,σT ) given by (2.4). Company
t ∈ T is viable if V nt (aT ,σT ) ≥ 0. Companies t0 ∈ L − T face the following entrance
problem. If t0 /∈ T participates by targeting σ > 0 on an audience A ∈ A, the set of
active companies becomes T 0 = T ∪ {t0} . Since λ ({t0}) = 0, this doesnt change attention
levels of subjects. Thus, t0 achieves maximal impact when picking an audience A∗ with
µ (A∗) = min {ρ (t0) , µ (S) , } in such a way that ν (s, τ s) ≥ ν (s0, τ s0) for all s ∈ A∗,
s0 ∈ S − A∗, and maximal net-value of impact when choosing optimal signal strength
σ∗t0 = argmax
R
A∗
zt0 (σ, ν (s, τ s)) dµ (s)− ct0 (σ) . Denote by V n∗t0 (aT , σT ) the maximal net-
value of impact achieved by t0 when participating in the contest for attention in an optimal
way. Company t0 is viable if V n∗t0 (aT , σT ) ≥ 0. It deÞnitely has an interest to enter if the
achieved value is strictly positive. If V n∗t0 (aT ,σT ) = 0, it is indiﬀerent with respect to
entry.
DeÞnition 3 (Free entry equilibrium). T, aT , σT is a free entry equilibrium if aT ,σT is
an equilibrium for T (according to DeÞnition 2) and the following property is satisÞed:
For all t ∈ T, V nt (aT ,σT ) ≥ 0, and V n∗t0 (aT , σT ) ≤ 0 for any t0 ∈ L− T.
The further analysis is restricted to economies in which attention levels are equalized
in equilibrium. In such an economy, equilibrium signal strength and equilibrium attention
level are uniquely determined for a given set T of active companies (see Theorem 1). They
are given by
σ∗T (t) = σ
∗
t (υ
∗
T ) with dσ
∗
t/dυ ≥ 0 (6.1)
υ∗T = υ (X
∗) with dυ/dX∗ < 0 (6.2)
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respectively, where X∗ is implicitly deÞned by the condition (see (5.6)):
X∗ =
Z
T
rtσ
∗
T (t) dt. (6.3)
This implies that also the maximal net-value of impact achieved by a company t ∈ T is
unique in an equilibrium for T.
For any t ∈ T facing equalized attention levels υ, the net-value which t achieves when
addressing a maximally feasible audience with signal strength σ is given by20 V nt (σ, υ) :=
rtzt (σ, υ) − ct (σ), where ct, zt satisfy (2.1), (5.3). The maximal net-value under υ is
V nt (σ
∗
t (υ) , υ) . Thus, in an equilibrium with equalized attention levels υ
∗
T , for every t ∈ L,
the maximal net-value that can be achieved by t is
V n∗t ≡ V nt (σ∗t (υ∗T ) , υ∗T ) = rtzt (σ∗t (υ∗T ) , υ∗T )− ct (σ∗t (υ∗T )) . (6.4)
(Note that no single company has an impact on υ and any company, t ∈ T as well as
t0 ∈ L− T, is confronted with the same attention level υ).21
Theorem 1 has shown for a given set of active companies T, that in an equilibrium
with equalized attention levels the equilibrium level of attention is unique. The follow-
ing theorem shows that in any free-entry equilibrium with equalized attention levels the
equilibrium level of attention is unique.
Theorem 3 . For given fundamentals (ρ (t) , zt, ct, t ∈ L, and attention capacities ν (s, ·) ,
s ∈ S) there exists a unique υ∗ ∈ R++ so that in any free-entry equilibrium T ∗, aT ∗,σ∗T∗
full-Þlling the assumptions of Theorem 1 (and thus (6.1) - (6.4)) the equilibrium level of
attention is equal to υ∗. Also aggregate signal emission X∗ is uniquely determined.
20So far function symbol V nt was used for V
n
t (aT ,σT ) in a given context aT ,σT . Now, the relevant
context is captured by a single variable υ. For saving notation I use the same symbol to denote net-value
as a function of σ and υ.
21The notational distinction between V nt (aT ,σT ) , for t ∈ T, and V n∗t (aT ,σT ) for t ∈ L − T, is no
longer necessary. Both values are given by V nt (σ
∗
t (υ) , υ) , where υ is the attention level implied by
aT ,σT .
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Proof. Appendix.
The theorem says that in an information-rich economy with scarcity of attention,
competitive grabbing for attention leads to unique levels of signal exposure and attention,
determined by sender technologies and receiver capacities. However, the theorem leaves
open how many senders are active in equilibrium.
According to DeÞnition 3, for identifying a possible equilibrium set T ∗ of active com-
panies we must check for which t ∈ L the values given by (6.4) are positive, zero, or
negative. Since companies may diﬀer in capacity ρ (t) , impact function zt or cost ct, it is
not possible to compare them without further restrictions. In the following an ordering
on the set of potential companies L is assumed. I call t more powerful (or stronger) than
t0 under υ if rtσ∗t (υ) > rt0σ
∗
t0 (υ) , i.e. if total signal emission coming from t is higher than
from t0 when both companies send with optimal strength. The following monotonicity
property says that stronger companies are also more valuable.
Assumption M (Monotonicity). Heterogeneity of ρ (t) , zt, ct, t ∈ L, is restricted in
such a way that, for all υ ∈ R++, V nt (σ∗t , υ) > V nt0 (σ∗t0, υ) if t is more powerful than t0
under υ (i.e. if rtσ∗t (υ) > rt0σ
∗
t0 (υ)).
Power is represented by a high rtσ∗t , that means, by sending widely and loudly. To
assume that this is valuable in terms of impact seems to be natural in an attention
economy. Being small and decent doesnt pay. Property M trivially holds if all potential
companies have identical fundamentals so that no company is stronger than another. Also
if they diﬀer only in range ρ (t) while having identical impact and cost functions, Property
M follows immediately from (6.4) and the envelope theorem. But M is generally satisÞed
when the fundamentals of companies can be ranked in a clear way. I call t non-inferior
to t0 if rt ≥ rt0 , ∂zt/∂σ ≥ ∂zt0/∂σ, c0t ≤ c0t0.22 If at least one inequality holds strictly, t is
22Since zt, ct are functions of υ and σ, the respective inequalities can hold locally or globally. In the
following analysis only the local properties at σ∗t (υ) are relevant. However, we make comparative-static
analysis with respect to υ.
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superior to t0. Thus, t is superior if it has a larger range or if it is better in the sense of
having higher marginal impact or lower marginal cost of signal production. The following
lemma shows how this ranking of companies in terms of fundamentals implies a ranking
in terms of power and value.
Lemma 2 . Suppose that L can be ordered so that t is non-inferior to t0 if t ≤ t0. Then:
(a) t is more powerful than t0 if and only if t is superior to t0. (b) If for all υ, t and t0,
∂zt/∂σ > (=) ∂zt0/∂σ implies zt > (=, resp.) zt0 , and c0t < (=) c
0
t0 implies ct < (=, resp.) ct0,
then Property M is fulÞlled.
Proof. Appendix.
Part (a) shows that companies can be ranked according to their emission power if they
can be ranked according to radiation capacity, marginal impact and marginal cost of signal
provision. Part (b) shows that this ranking implies a ranking in terms of the net-values
of impact which can be achieved by the respective companies. For instance, if companies
have diﬀerent radiation capacities ρ (t) but have access to the some technology for signal
and impact productions so that ct and zt are identical, then companies with larger range
send more powerfully and achieve a higher net-value of impact. In an analogous way, a
ranking according to power and net-value is possible if companies have access to the same
radiation technology so that ρ (t) = ρ (t0) for all t, t0 ∈ L, but some of them have a cost
advantage in signal production or an impact advantage in the sense that they achieve
higher impact with the same signal strength. According to (b), a suﬃcient condition for
M is that an advantage at the margin means also an advantage overall.
Theorem 4 . Let T ∗, aT ∗,σ∗T ∗ be a free-entry equilibrium fulÞlling the assumptions of
Theorem 1 (and thus (6.1)  (6.4)). Under M: (a) λ (T ∗) is uniquely determined by the
fundamentals of the attention economy. (b) If L can be ordered so that t is non-inferior to
t0 if t ≤ t0, then: t superior to t0 and t0 ∈ T ∗ imply t ∈ T ∗ and V n∗t > V n∗t0 . (V n∗t evaluated
at the (unique) equilibrium attention level υ∗.)
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Proof. Appendix.
Part (a) of the theorem answers the question of how many senders are viable in an
economy with scarce attention. Even though in general there is no unique equilibrium set
of active companies T ∗ and no unique equilibrium audience allocation, equilibrium mea-
sure λ (T ∗) is uniquely determined. Hence, comparative-static analysis about equilibrium
diversity is possible. If senders are identical it doesnt matter which subset T ⊂ L of
equilibrium measure is active. If there is heterogeneity of potential senders, in an equi-
librium those companies dominate which are large or have a better technology for impact
production (Part (b) of the theorem). They send more powerfully (see Lemma 2) and
survive the contest of attention. An immediate consequence of (b) is that t0 ∈ L − T ∗
cannot be superior to t ∈ T ∗.
In the following comparative-static analysis µ (S) and attention capacities are kept un-
changed while the companies fundamentals change from bt ≡ (rt, zt, ct) to ebt = (ert, ezt,ect) ,
t ∈ L. I say that eb is a progress over b on E ∈ B if eb and b coincide on L − E and, for
every t ∈ E, ebt is advantageous compared to bt in the following sense: For t ∈ E, ert ≥ rt,ezt ≥ zt, ∂ezt/∂σ ≥ ∂zt/∂σ, ect ≤ ct, ec0t ≤ c0t and at least one of the following properties
hold: ert > rt, or ezt > zt and ∂ezt/∂σ > ∂zt/∂σ, or ect < ct and ec0t < c0t. In words, companies
in E experience progress in radiation capacity or in impact or signal production.
Theorem 5 . Consider two (otherwise identical) attention economies with sender fun-
damentals b and eb, respectively. Assume that under b as well as under eb Assumption
M is satisÞed. Let T ∗, aT ∗,σ∗T ∗ and eT, a eT , eσ eT be free-entry equilibria for the respective
economies satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1. Let T0 := {t ∈ T ∗ |V n∗t = 0} be the
(possibly empty) set of marginal companies under b. If eb is a progress over b on some
E ⊂ T ∗, λ (E) > 0, then: (a) eυ ≤ υ∗. (b) λ³eT´ < λ (T ∗) , if eυ = υ∗ or if λ (T0 −E) > 0.
(eυ, υ∗ denote the respective equilibrium attention levels. Their uniqueness is guaranteed
by Theorem 3.)
Proof. Appendix.
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The theorem answers the question, how in an information-rich economy with scarcity
of attention, equilibrium attention and equilibrium diversity depend on the fundamentals
of the economy. If there is progress in the means of grabbing for attention, equilibrium
attention certainly does not increase (Part (a)) and necessarily declines if no senders vanish
(Þrst if-clause in Part (b)). Regardless of whether or not the attention level declines, a
suﬃcient condition for a reduction of the measure of active senders is that not all marginal
senders are subject to the considered progress (second if-clause in Part (b)). However,
as Example 3 will show, also a uniform increase in radiation possibilities for all potential
senders, or international integration may lead to declining attention and diversity. The
economic mechanism behind this result is as follows: If companies get access to a radiation
technology allowing a wider range of receivers, to a more powerful impact technology, or
to less costly signal production, they produce and distribute stronger signals. Since the
increased signal exposure leads to a decline in the receivers attention level, other senders
with weaker signals are no longer suﬃciently perceived to achieve viable impact. From
the point of view of receivers, this means that the diversity of senders changes. However,
the impacts on aggregate and local diversity must be carefully distinguished.
Aggregate diversity addressed in Theorem 4 and 5 is important from the perspective of
an outside observer of the world. Howmany diﬀerent senders  i.e. producers and emitters
of signals pointing to ideas, products, issues  survive in a given attention economy? Why
may small networks, local journals or national scientiÞc communities vanish? By contrast
to this global perspective, for every single receiver the experienced variety of senders is
given by the measure λ (M (s, aT ∗)) of the senders of which s is a member. I called it
local diversity. By deÞnition, for all s ∈ S, M (s, aT ∗) ⊂ T ∗. Local diversity is limited
by aggregate diversity. Nonetheless, M (s, aT ∗) may increase for some or even all s even
if λ (T ∗) is reduced. More formally, let m∗ ≡ (1/µ (S)) R
S
λ (M (s, aT ∗) dµ (s)) denote
average local equilibrium diversity and r ≡ (1/λ (T ∗)) R
T∗
rtdt denote average range of
active senders. Since the aggregate measure of memberships is equal to the aggregate
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measure of audiences,23 local diversity experienced on average is given by the equation
m∗ = rλ∗/µ (S) with λ∗ ≡ λ (T ∗) . (6.5)
Obviously, the eﬀect of rt-changes on m∗ is ambiguous if the eﬀect on λ∗ is negative.
In the simple example considered in Section 3, an increase of the radiation capacity of
senders can lead to a decline in aggregate diversity, while diversity experienced from the
local perspective of every single receiver deÞnitely rises. The further analysis looks at the
robustness of this outcome. As a Þrst step, I examine the comparative-static properties of
attention economies satisfying the features of Example 2. Moreover, I consider the eﬀects
of international integration.
Example 3 . Suppose that potential senders are identical with ρ (t) = ρ > 1, ct (σ) =
σ+ c0 and zt (σ, υ) = g (υ) (ln σ + γ) if σ > 1, where c0 > 0, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and g (υ) = g0υα,
g0 ∈ R++, α > 0. (Note that these are instances of the cost- and impact functions discussed
in Example 2.) Moreover, for all s ∈ S, ν (s, τ s) = τ−βs , β > 0.
We know already that for such an economy an equilibrium with equalized attention
levels exists for a given set T ⊂ L of active companies. (It is assumed that L is suﬃciently
large so that not all potential senders are active in an equilibrium.) Moreover, since all
potential senders are identical, M is satisÞed and thus, according to Theorem 4, the
measure λ (T ∗) of active companies is unique in a free entry equilibrium. Both aggregate
and local diversity are characterized by the following fact:
Fact 3. In an attention economy as described in Example 3: (a) Aggregate diversity is
given by λ∗ = λ0µ (S) r(1−αβ)/(αβ), where r = min {ρ, µ (S)} and λ0 is a positive constant
which is positively related to γ, g0 and negatively related to c0. (b) Local diversity is given
by m∗ = λ0r1/(αβ).
Proof. Appendix.
23Set σT = 1, µ (aT (t)) = rt in Lemma A1, to get
R
S
λ (M (s, aT )) dµ (s) =
R
T
rtdt.
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For the evaluation of comparative-static eﬀects on equilibrium diversity two cases must
be distinguished. If µ (S) ≤ ρ, λ∗ reduces to λ0µ (S)1/(αβ) and m∗ = λ∗. If µ (S) > ρ,
then r = ρ and λ∗ decreases (increases) with ρ if αβ > 1 (αβ < 1, respectively) , whereas
local diversity m∗ unambiguously increases. Note that α is the elasticity of economic
impact with respect to attention level υ. And β is the elasticity with which a receivers
spare capacity for processing further signals, ν (s, τ s) , declines when signal exposure τ s
rises. Thus αβ > 1, if economic impact sensitively depends on attention and/or attention
declines with signal exposure relatively rapidly.
From an economic point of view the comparative-static analysis leads to important
insights concerning eﬀects of globalization on diversity. Globalization in an attention
economy means that senders get access to a larger space of receivers. This can have two
reasons: International integration or progress in the radiation technology.
International integration is relevant if the radiation technology is suﬃciently advanced
so that audiences larger than the population of an isolated economy can be addressed.
Integration allows to senders to exploit these possibilities. To see the eﬀects on diversity,
consider two identical economies with receiver set Si, µ (Si) = µ, i = H,F. Senders have
access to a radiation technology which allows them to cover more than Si, but not the
whole world SW = SH ∪ SF , µ ¡SW¢ = 2µ. This means, they have identical radiation
capacities with µ < ρ < 2µ. Thus, ra = min {ρ, µ} = µ in the closed economy and
rW = min {ρ, 2µ} = ρ in the integrated world. Using this in Fact 3, we obtain for
equilibrium diversity in the closed economy: λ∗a = m
∗
a = λ0µ
1/(αβ). This gives for total
diversity in the world: λ∗tot = 2λ
∗
a. In the integrated world with cross-border radiation,
equilibrium diversity is given by λ∗W = λ02µρ
(1−αβ)/(αβ) and m∗W = λ0ρ
1/(αβ). Comparing
autarky diversity with diversity in the integrated word, we get: m∗W > m
∗
a since ρ > µ.
Thus, local diversity experienced by an average receiver is larger under international
integration than in a closed economy. However, with respect to global diversity the eﬀect
of integration is ambiguous. We have λ∗W < λ
∗
tot if 1 > (µ/ρ)
1−1/(αβ) . Since µ < ρ was
assumed, this implies λ∗W < λ
∗
tot if αβ > 1. For αβ < 1, λ
∗
W > λ
∗
tot. Although each subject
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is exposed to more diﬀerent senders, fewer senders are active after integration. The reason
is that senders have a radiation technology under which international radiation is feasible,
and international integration allows full use of the radiation range. As a consequence, more
subjects are exposed to the same senders and, if αβ > 1, i.e. if the reaction of attention
to signal exposure and the relation of economic impact to attention are relatively elastic,
some senders are driven out of the market.
The second source of globalization in an attention economy is technical progress leading
to an increase in the feasible range of radiation. To study the eﬀect on diversity, suppose
there is an integrated world with µ
¡
SW
¢
= µW and identical senders whose range increases
from ρI to ρII > ρI where 1 < ρI < µW is assumed. Then, according to Fact 3, diversity
under range ρI is given by λ
∗
I = λ0µWρ
(1−αβ)/(αβ)
I , m
∗
I = λ0ρ
1/(αβ)
I whereas under range
ρII diversity is λ
∗
II = λ0µW r
(1−αβ)/(αβ)
II , m
∗
II = λ0r
1/(αβ)
II where rII = min {µW , ρII} > ρI .
Thus, again m∗II > m
∗
I , and λ
∗
II < λ
∗
I (λ
∗
II = λ
∗
I , λ
∗
II > λ
∗
I) if αβ > 1 (αβ = 1, αβ < 1,
respectively).
In the above example local diversity rises with r even when global diversity falls.
Although this is not necessarily so in general, it is not just an incidental possibility.
According to (6.5), for r < µ (S) , local diversity can only fall if aggregate diversity drops
highly elastically in reaction to wider radiation. To get a suﬃcient condition for rising
local diversity consider symmetric companies and receivers with ν (s, τ ) = f (τ ) , f 0 < 0.
Then, V n = r z (σ, υ) − c (σ) and the Þrst-order condition for optimal signal strength
σ∗ (r, υ) is:
r zσ (σ, υ)− c0 (σ) = 0. (6.6)
Combining this with zero-proÞt condition
r z (σ∗ (r, υ) , υ)− c (σ∗ (r, υ)) = 0, (6.7)
we get υ (r) with υ0 (r) = − z
r zυ
. (Subscripts of z denote partial derivatives.)
On the other hand, υ = f (τ ) , where τ = m σ∗ (r, υ) . In sum, we have the equation
f (m σ∗ (r, υ (r)))− υ (r) = 0, (6.8)
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characterizing equilibrium diversity m∗ as a function of range r. Implicit diﬀerentiation
gives us:24
dm∗
dr
> 0 iﬀ
z |D|
rm
> |f 0| (zσzυ − zzσυ) , (6.9)
where D ≡ r zσσ − c00 < 0 is the second-order condition for (6.6). According to (6.9), a
positive impact of r on local diversity is more likely if attention drops little under increased
signal exposure (i.e. |f 0| is small). Moreover, a suﬃcient condition for dm∗/dr > 0 is:
zυ
z
≤ zσυ
zσ
. (6.10)
Hence, local diversity certainly rises with r if the (marginal) eﬀect of signal strength
on impact is at least as sensitive to receiver attention as the level of impact, i.e. if the
interaction of signal strength and attention level is important for generating impact.25
7 Conclusion
The presented theory explains the basic mechanisms at work in an economy in which
earning attention and achieving impact are prerequisites of economic viability.
The exogenous fundamentals are on the one side the space of receivers and their
attention capacities, and on the other side the potential set of senders and their radiation
and impact technologies.
The endogenous variables explained by the theory are equilibrium audiences (the
clients belonging to a company), equilibrium signal exposure and attention, and the mea-
sure of active senders in a free-entry equilibrium. Although there are multiple equilibrium
allocations of audiences to senders, equilibrium signal strength, equilibrium attention level
and equilibrium measure of active senders can be uniquely characterized.
24From (6.8) we get dmdr >,=, < 0 if |υ0| >,=, < |f 0|m
³
∂σ∗
∂r +
∂σ∗
∂υ υ
0
´
, respectively. Using υ0 (r) = − zrzυ
from (6.7) and ∂σ
∗
∂r =
zσ
|D| ,
∂σ∗
∂υ =
r zσυ
|D| from (6.6) we can rewrite this condition as (6.9).
25For z (σ, υ) = g (σ)h (υ) , g0 > 0, h0 > 0, condition (6.10) trivially holds.
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For an information-rich economy with scarcity of attention, the theory predicts that
changes allowing to senders more powerful signal emission  for instance, an extension
of feasible radiation ranges, cheaper signal production, more eﬀective methods of impact
generation, but also international integration  tend to decrease global diversity of senders
and attention levels of subjects. Declining local diversity, measured by the variety of
senders experienced by the individual receivers, is less likely.
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Appendix
We prove Þrst two lemmas which are important in several proofs.
Lemma A1. For T, σT , aT ⊂ T × S, let b (t, s) :=
 σT (t) , if (t, s) ∈ aT0 , otherwise
be the signal emission on s ∈ S from t ∈ T under aT . For any aT ∈ B ×A: (a) b (t, s) is
measurable B×A. (b) R
M(s,aT )
σT (t) dt is a measurable function on S. (c)
R
S
R
M(s,aT )
σT (t) dt
dµ (s) =
R
T
µ (aT (t))σT (t) dt.
Proof. (a) DeÞne eσT (t, s) = σT (t) . For any y ∈ R+, the set {(t, s) |eσT (t, s) > y} =
{t |σT (t) > y} × S is a measurable rectangle, since σT is measurable B. Thus, eσT (t, s)
is measurable B × A. Since b (t, s) = IaT eσT , where IaT is the indicator function on
aT , also b (t, s) is measurable B × A. Properties (b) and (c) follow from Fubini s theo-
rem (see e.g. Billingsley [1995] , p. 234). Note that b (t, s) is non-negative. Moreover,R
T
b (t, s) dt =
R
M(s,aT )
σT (t) dt and
R
S
b (t, s) dµ (s) =
R
aT (t)
σT (t) dµ (s) = µ (aT (t))σT (t) ,
since b (t, s) = 0 for t /∈M (s, aT ) or s /∈ aT (t) . QED.
Lemma A2. Suppose that aT is an equilibrium audience allocation for T, σT > 0. If
there exist sets A, A0 ∈ A of positive measure so that ν (s, τ s) < ν (s0, τ s0) for all s ∈ A,
s0 ∈ A0, then: µ (A0 − aT (t)) = 0 or µ (aT (t) ∩ A) = 0, for all t ∈ T.
Proof. Suppose that µ (A0 − aT (t)) > 0 and µ (aT (t) ∩ A) > 0 for some t ∈ T. The
divisibility assumption imposed on (S,A, µ) implies that A0 − aT (t) and aT (t) ∩ A con-
tain measurable subsets B0 and B, respectively, with µ (B) = µ (B0) > 0. Let a0T be the
audience allocation resulting from aT when aT (t) is replaced by a0T (t) := (aT (t)−B)∪
B0. Since µ (a0T (t)) = µ (aT (t)) ≤ ρ (t) , a0T is a feasible deviation for t. We show that
it is attractive for t to deviate from aT to a0T . If t retargets its signals from aT (t) to
a0T (t) , then for s ∈ B membership changes to M (s, a0T ) = M (s, aT ) − {t} , whereas
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for s ∈ B0 membership changes to M (s, a0T ) = M (s, aT ) ∪ {t} . Since singletons have
zero measure,
R
M(s,aT )
σT (t) dt =
R
M(s,a0T )
σT (t) dt for all s ∈ S. Thus, signal exposure
τ s is not aﬀected by the deviation from aT to a0T . Since B ⊂ A and B0 ⊂ A0, we
have ν (s, τ s) < ν (s0, τ s0) for s ∈ B and s0 ∈ B0. Moreover, since zt is increasing in υ
we obtain Vt (a0T ,σT ) =
R
aT (t)
zt (σT (t) , ν (s, τ s)) dµ (s) −
R
B
zt (σT (t) , ν (s, τ s)) dµ (s) +R
B0
zt (σT (t) , ν (s, τ s)) dµ (s) > Vt (aT , σT ) . This is a contradiction to the assumption that
aT is an equilibrium audience allocation. QED.
The rest of the Appendix contains the proofs of the claims in the text.
Proof of Proposition 1. Necessity of (a)  (d): (a) Suppose there are A,A0 ∈ A
with positive measure so that for all s ∈ A, s0 ∈ A0, ν (s, τ s) < ν (s0, τ s0) , M (s0, aT ) = ∅
and s ∈ aT (t) for some t. According to Lemma A2, µ (A0 − aT (t)) = 0 or µ (A ∩ aT (t)) =
0. The Þrst clause implies that almost all s0 ∈ A0 belong to aT (t) which contradicts
M (s0, aT ) = ∅. The second clause contracts the assumption that all s ∈ A belong to aT (t) .
(b) Suppose there are A, A0 ∈ A with positive measure so that ν (s0, τ s0) < ν (s, τ s) ,
M (s0, aT ) = T and M (s, aT ) 6= T for all s ∈ A, s0 ∈ A0. According to Lemma A1,
µ (A− aT (t)) = 0 or µ (A0 ∩ aT (t)) = 0 for all t ∈ T. However, the Þrst clause cannot
hold for t ∈ T −M (s, aT ) , and the second clause contradicts M (s0, aT ) = T for s0 ∈ A0.
(c) Follows immediately from Lemma A1. (d) Suppose that µ (aT (t)) < rt. The divisi-
bility property imposed on (S,A, µ) implies that a measurable set A ⊂ S − aT (t) exists
with µ (A) = rt − µ (aT (t)) . Let a0T be the audience allocation resulting from aT when
aT (t) is replaced by a0T (t) := aT (t)∪A. Since µ (a0T (t)) = rt, a0T is a feasible deviation for
t. Moreover, by targeting the unused radiation capacity ρ (t)− µ (aT (t)) on A, company
t attracts additional attention implying Vt (a0T ,σT ) > Vt (aT , σT ) . (Note that µ (A) > 0
and zt (σT (t) , υ) > 0 for σT (t) > 0.) This is a contradiction to the assumption that aT
is an equilibrium allocation.
Suﬃciency of (c) and (d): Because of (d), no company can increase the measure of
its audience. Thus, Vt (aT ,σT ) can only be increased if t retargets its signals σT (t) from
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a measurable subset A ⊂ aT (t) to a measurable subset A0 ⊂ S − aT (t) , µ (A0) ≤ µ (A) ,
so that
R
A
zt (σT (t) , ν (s, τ s)) dµ (s) <
R
A0
zt (σT (t) , ν (s, τ s)) dµ (s) . This is only pos-
sible if there exist measurable B ⊂ A, B0 ⊂ A0 with µ (B) = µ (B0) > 0 so that
ν (s, τ s) < ν (s
0, τ s0) for almost all s ∈ B, s0 ∈ B0. In sum, there must be B, B0 with
µ (B ∩ aT (t)) = µ (B) > 0, µ (B0 ∩ aT (t)) = 0 and higher attention levels in B0 than B.
This is in contradiction to Condition (c). Thus no such deviation exists. QED.
Proof of Corollary 2. Take S−υ , S
+
υ as deÞned in Proposition 1.
Step 1 : Since µ (aT (t)) = min {ρ (t) , µ (S)} , ρ (t) ≥ µ (S+υ ) implies µ (aT (t) ∩ S−υ ) 6= 0 or
µ (aT (t)) = µ (S
+
υ ) . This implies µ (S
+
υ − aT (t)) = 0, according to Proposition 1 (c). An
analogous argument leads to µ (aT (t) ∩ S−υ ) = 0 if ρ (t) < µ (S+υ ) .
Step 2: By deÞnition, µ (S+υ ) is a non-increasing function of υ starting at µ
¡
S+0
¢
= µ (S)
and eventually reaching zero since ν is bounded. µ (S+υ ) = µ (S) implies that almost all
subjects have at least attention level υ, whereas µ (S+υ ) = 0 means that almost all sub-
jects have lower attention level than υ. Hence, ν (s, τ s) = υ+ for almost all s if and only if
µ (S+υ ) = µ (S) for all υ ≤ υ+ and µ (S+υ ) = 0 for all υ > υ+. (The if part is obvious. For
the only if part suppose that 0 < µ (S+υ ) < µ (S) for some υ > 0. Then also µ (S
−
υ ) > 0
and ν (s, τ s) ≥ υ > ν (s0, τ s0) for s ∈ S+υ , s0 ∈ S−υ .)
Step 3: Suppose that Property (a) in Corollary 2 does not hold. Then, according to Step
2, 0 < µ (S+υ ) < µ (S) for some υ. Suppose that heterogeneity of radiation capacities is
restricted so that either ρ (t) ≥ µ (S+υ ) for all t or ρ (t) < µ (S+υ ) for all t. In the Þrst case,
Step 1 implies µ (S+υ − aT (t)) = 0 for all t and thus Part (b) of the corollary holds foreF = S+υ . In the second case, Step 1 implies (c) with eU = S−υ . QED.
Proof of Fact 1. For k = 1, . . . , K, deÞne nk := max {1, µ (S) /ρk} and mk :=
λ (Tk) rk/µ (S) . By assumption, nk is a natural number. Decompose S into nk subsets
Sik, i = 1, . . . , nk, of equal size µ (S
i
k) = rk so that
S
i
Sik = S and S
i
k ∩ Sjk = ∅ for i 6= j.
Moreover, decompose Tk into nk subsets T ik, i = 1, . . . , nk, of equal size λ (T
i
k) = mk so
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that
S
i
T ik = Tk and T
i
k ∩ T jk = ∅ if i 6= j. Then, the audience allocation aT deÞned by
aT (t) = S
i
k if t ∈ T ik satisÞes the following properties: (i) µ (aT (t)) = rk for all t ∈ T.
(ii) For any s ∈ S and k ∈ {1, . . . , K} there is i (k, s) ∈ {1, . . . , nk} , so that s ∈ Si(k,s)k .
Moreover, M (s, aT )∩Tk = T i(k,s)k and τ s =
R
M(s,aT )
σT (t) dt =
P
k
σkλ
³
T
i(k,s)
k
´
=
P
k
σkmk.
Thus, for all s, ν (s, τ s) = f
µP
k
σkmk
¶
. Property (i) guarantees that no company can
increase its impact by increasing the size of its audience and Property (ii) implies equal
attention levels. Thus, according to Corollary 1, aT is an equilibrium. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that there are two audience allocations a1T , a
2
T with
the required properties, i.e. ν (s, τ is) = eυi for some constant eυi and τ is ≥ τ+s , where
τ+s =
R
M(s,aiT )
σT (t) dt, i = 1, 2. Suppose eυ1 6= eυ2, say eυ2 < eυ1. Then, because of SA,
τ2s > τ
1
s for almost all s. This implies
R
S
τ2sdµ (s) >
R
S
τ1sdµ (s) , in contradiction to Lemma
A1 (c), according to which
R
S
τ sdµ (s) = X for any allocation aT with µ (aT (t)) = rt, t ∈ T.
Hence, for any given X, eυ1 = eυ2 ≡ eυ. DeÞne υ (X) = eυ. Suppose next that ρ (t) , t ∈ T, or
σT change, so that X increases to X 0. Let aT , a0T be audience allocations with the required
properties (i.e. µ (aT (t)) = rt, µ (a0T (t)) = r
0
t, τ s ≥ τ+s , τ 0s ≥ τ+s , ν (s, τ s) = eυ, ν ¡s, τ 0s¢ =eυ0, where notation is analogous to before). X 0 > X implies R
S
τ 0sdµ (s) >
R
S
τ sdµ (s) and
thus τ 0s > τ s on a set A ⊂ S with positive measure. Because of SA, ν (s, τ 0s) < ν (s, τ s)
for s ∈ A and thus eυ0 < eυ. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3. (a) By deÞnition, V nt = µ (aT (t)) zt (σ, υ)−ct (σ) , if ν (s, τ s) =
υ for almost all s. Thus, the Þrst-order condition for max
σ
V nt (σ) is given by
F ≡ µ (aT (t)) ∂zt (σ, υ)
∂σ
− c0t (σ) = 0.
The assumptions in (2.1) and (5.3) guarantee that the equation has a solution and im-
plicitly deÞnes σ∗t (µ (aT (t)) , υ) > 0 with ∂σ
∗
t/∂µ > 0 and ∂σ
∗
t/∂υ ≥ 0. The second-order
condition ∂F/∂σ < 0 holds because of ∂2zt/∂σ2 < 0 and c00t ≥ 0. (b) According to (a), at
σ∗t we have V
n
t = µ (aT (t)) zt (σ
∗
t (·) , υ) − ct (σ∗t (·)) . Applying the envelope theorem, we
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obtain ∂V nt /∂µ = zt > 0 and ∂V
n
t /∂υ = µ (aT (t)) ∂zt/∂υ > 0. QED.
Proof of Lemma 1. For υ ∈ (0, ν (s, τ+s )) , the equation ν (s, τ ) = υ deÞnes for all
s signal exposure τ (s, υ) > τ+s where τ (s, υ) is diﬀerentiable in υ with ∂τ/∂υ < 0.
Thus,
R
S
τ (s, υ) ds is a diﬀerentiable and decreasing function of υ. Since
R
S
τ (s, υ) ds = X,
according to Lemma A1 (c), υ is a diﬀerentiable decreasing function of X.
According to the proof of Proposition 3, for given µ (aT (t)) , υ, optimal signal strength
σ∗t (µT (aT (t)) , υ) is determined by the Þrst-order condition F (t,σ) = µ (aT (t))
∂zt(σ,υ)
∂σ
−
c0t (σ) = 0. Since ∂F/∂σ < 0,σ
∗
t ≤ y if and only if F (t, y) ≤ 0 for any y ∈ R+.
Thus, {t |σT (t) ≤ y} = {t |F (t, y) ≤ 0} which is a measurable set, if the functions
a (t) := ∂zt (σ, υ) /∂σ and b (t) := c0t (σ) are measurable. QED.
Proof of Theorem 2. Only the impact on X∗ [T, rT ] has to be proved. The eﬀect
on υ∗T follows from SA. According to Proposition 3, σ
∗
t (ert, υ (X)) > σ∗t (ρ (t) , υ (X)) for
all t ∈ T0. (Note ert = min {µ (S) ,eρ (t)} > ρ (t) .) This implies Z (X, T, erT ) > Z (X, T, rT ) ,
where Z is deÞned in (5.6). Since ∂Z/∂X ≤ 0, the equilibrium level eX deÞned by the
equation Z
³ eX, T, erT´ = eX is higher than the level deÞned by Z (X,T, rT ) = X. QED.
Proof of Fact 2. Let aT be the audience allocation constructed in the proof of Fact
1. Chose υ and τ such that υ = f (τ ) and
τ =
1
µ (S)
X
k
λ (Tk) r
2
kgk (υ) /c
1
k. (A.1)
Then for t ∈ Tk :
V nt = rk [gk (υ) ln σ + hk (υ)]− ck1σ − ck0 (A.2)
and argmaxV nt = σ
∗
k where
σ∗k = rkgk (υ) /c
1
k. (A.3)
For τ s = τ , Lemma A1, Part (c) implies µ (S) τ =
R
T
rtσT (t) dt =
P
k
rkσkλ (Tk) and
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thus:
τ =
X
µ (S)
with X =
X
k
rkσkλ (Tk) . (A.4)
Substituting σ∗k for σk we get (A.1) with υ = f (τ) . Thus, σT (t) = σ
∗
k, t ∈ T, is an
equilibrium under aT . Obviously, aT is an equilibrium for T, σT since ν (s, aT ) = υ for all
s and µ (aT (t)) = rt for all t ∈ T.
For proving (b), note that in any equilibrium with equalized attention levels we must
have τ s = τ , f (τ) = υ and µ (aT (t)) = rk, t ∈ Tk. Thus, (A.2)  (A.4) hold. They imply
equation (A.1). Since υ = f (τ) , f 0 ≤ 0, g0k ≥ 0, this equation implicitly deÞnes τ as a
function τ∗ (λ (T1) , . . . , λ (TK) , ρ1, . . . , ρK) with ∂τ
∗/∂λ (Tk) > 0 and ∂τ ∗/∂ρk > 0 (= 0)
if ρk < µ (S) (≥ µ (S) , respectively) . (Substitute rk = min {ρk, µ (S)} into (A.1).) (More-
over, τ ∗ (·) is lower (higher) in a large economy of size µ (S 0) than in a small economy
µ (S) < µ (S 0) if ρk < µ (S) (ρk ≥ µ (S) , respectively) for all k = 1, . . . , K.) QED.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that T ∗i , aT ∗i , σ
∗
T ∗i
, i = 1, 2, are free-entry equilibria with
equilibrium attention levels υ∗T ∗i := υi (X
∗
i ) , respectively. For simplifying notation, set
υi := υ
∗
T ∗i
and σit := σ
∗
t (υi) , for any t ∈ L. Moreover, denote by τ is signal exposure of s in
equilibrium i and deÞne Bi := T ∗i − (T ∗1 ∩ T ∗2 ) . Then,
X∗1 =
Z
T ∗1 ∩T ∗2
rtσ
1
tdt+
Z
B1
rtσ
1
tdt, X
∗
2 =
Z
T ∗1 ∩T∗2
rtσ
2
tdt+
Z
B2
rtσ
2
tdt. (A.5)
Assume that υ1 = υ1 (X∗1 ) < υ2 = υ2 (X
∗
2 ) . (Since Indices 1 and 2 can be exchanged,
the following contradiction also applies to υ2 < υ1, which establishes υ1 = υ2.) Note
Þrst that υ1 < υ2 implies V 2t ≡ V nt (σ2t , υ2) ≥ V nt (σ1t , υ2) > V nt (σ1t , υ1) ≡ V 1t , for any
t ∈ L. (The Þrst inequality follows from the deÞnition of σit as the optimal choice under
υi. The second inequality follows from ∂V nt /∂υ = rt∂zt/∂υ > 0.) I show that υ1 < υ2 and
V 2t > V
1
t , t ∈ T ∗1 , lead to a contradiction: (i) On the one hand, since SA with τ is ≥ τ+s
is assumed, υ1 < υ2 implies τ 1s > τ
2
s and
R
S
τ1sdµ (s) >
R
S
τ2sdµ (s) . Thus, according to
Lemma A1, X∗1 > X
∗
2 . (ii) On the other hand, viability of t ∈ T ∗1 requires V 1t ≥ 0 so
that V 2t > V
1
t implies V
2
t > 0. Hence, T
∗
1 ⊂ T ∗2 , B1 = ∅, B2 = T ∗2 − T ∗1 . Moreover, for all
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t ∈ T ∗1 = T ∗1 ∩ T ∗2 , σ1t ≤ σ2t because of ∂σit/∂υ ≥ 0 (see Proposition 3). Combining this
with (A.5), we conclude X∗1 ≤ X∗2 . This contradicts (i). Finally, υ1 = υ2 for all s implies
τ1s = τ
2
s and thus X
∗
1 =
R
S
τ 1sdµ (s) =
R
S
τ 2sdµ (s) = X
∗
2 . QED.
Proof of Lemma 2. (a) The Þrst-order condition deÞning σ∗t (υ) is F (σ, υ) ≡ rt∂zt (σ, υ)
/∂σ− c0t (σ) = 0. Since ∂F/∂σ < 0, σ∗t ≥ σ∗t0 , if t is non-inferior to t0. σ∗t > σ∗t0, if t superior
to t0. Thus, t superior to t0 is suﬃcient for rtσ∗t > rt0σ
∗
t0. It is also necessary: Suppose t is not
superior to t0. Then t is identical to t0 or t0 is superior to t, which would imply rtσ∗t ≤ rt0σ∗t0.
(b) By deÞnition, V nt (σ
∗
t , υ) = rtzt (σ
∗
t , υ)−ct (σ∗t ) . According to (a), rtσ∗t > rt0σ∗t0 implies
t is non-inferior to t0 and (i) rt > rt0, or (ii) ∂zt/∂σ > ∂zt0/∂σ or (iii) c0t < c
0
t0 . In case
(i) V nt > V
n
t0 (evaluated at the respective arguments) follows from the assumption that
non-inferiority implies zt ≥ zt0 and ct ≤ ct0 . In the cases (ii), (iii), it follows from non-
inferiority of t and the assumption that (ii) implies zt > zt0 and (iii) implies ct < ct0 . QED.
Proof of Theorem 4. (a) Suppose that there are two equilibria T ∗1 , T
∗
2 with λ (T
∗
1 ) <
λ (T ∗2 ) and thus 0 ≤ λ (B1) < λ (B2) , where Bi := T ∗i − (T ∗1 ∩ T ∗2 ) . According to Theorem
2, υ1 = υ2 = υ∗, and thus X∗1 = X
∗
2 , σ
1
t = σ
2
t ≡ σt, V nt (σit, υi) = V nt (σt, υ∗) for any t ∈ L.
(Notation as in proof of Theorem 3.) This implies
V ∗t ≡ V nt (σt, υ∗) = 0 for t ∈ B1 ∪B2. (A.6)
(Note that B1 ⊂ T ∗1 , B2 ⊂ T ∗2 imply V nt (σt, υ∗) ≥ 0 for t ∈ B1∪B2. But since Bj∩T ∗i = ∅,
i 6= j, V nt (σt, υ∗) = V nt (σit, υi) ≤ 0 if t ∈ Bj .)
Moreover, according to (A.5), X∗1 = X
∗
2 , σ
1
t = σ
2
t implyZ
B1
rtσtdt =
Z
B2
rtσtdt. (A.7)
Since λ (B1) < λ (B2) , equation (A.7) can only hold if Bi ⊂ Bi,λ
¡
Bi
¢
> 0, exist so that
rtσt > rt0σt0 for t ∈ B1, t0 ∈ B2. Thus, according to M,V nt (σt, υ∗) > V nt0 (σt0, υ∗) ≥ 0 for
t ∈ B1 ⊂ B1, t0 ∈ B2 ⊂ B2, in contradiction to (A.6).
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(b) t0 ∈ T ∗ implies V ∗t0 ≥ 0. According to Lemma 2 (a), t superior to t0 implies t is
more powerful than t0 and thus, according to M,V ∗t > V
∗
t0 ≥ 0. Hence, t ∈ T ∗. QED.
Proof of Theorem 5. Theorem 3 and 4 guarantee that unique values for equilibrium
attention υ∗, eυ, aggregate signal emission X∗, eX, and measures λ (T ∗) ,λ³eT´ of the set
of active companies exist in the two equilibria.
(a) Assume that υ∗ < eυ : Denote eV nt (σ, υ) := ertezt (σ, υ) − ect (σ) and eσt (υ) := argmaxeV nt (σ, υ) . Then, eVt ≡ eV nt (eσt (eυ) , eυ) > eV nt (eσt (υ∗) , υ∗) , since ∂eV nt /∂υ = ert∂ezt/∂υ > 0,
due to the envelope theorem. Moreover, for all t ∈ L, eV nt (eσt (υ∗) , υ∗) ≥ eV nt (σ∗t (υ∗) , υ∗) ≥
V nt (σ
∗
t (υ
∗) , υ∗) ≡ V n∗t . (The Þrst inequality follows from the deÞnition of eσt as the optimal
choice under eV nt . The second inequality follows from eV nt (σ, υ) ≥ V nt (σ, υ) by construction
(eb was assumed to be a progress over b). In sum, eV n∗t > V n∗t for all t ∈ L. According to
the proof of Theorem 3, eV n∗t > V n∗t , t ∈ T ∗ and υ∗ < eυ lead to a contradiction. (Note that
the argument did not rely on the underlying fundamentals.) Thus, υ∗ ≥ eυ. This proves
Part (a).
(b) (i) By construction, for all t ∈ E, eσt (υ) > σ∗t (υ) and erteσt (υ) > rtσ∗t (υ) for any υ.
Moreover, for t ∈ E, eV nt (σ, υ) = ertezt (σ, υ) − ect (σ) > V nt (σ, υ) = rtz (σ, υ) − ct (σ) for
any σ, υ. For t ∈ L − E, eσt (υ) = σ∗t (υ) , erteσt (υ) = rtσ∗t (υ) and eV nt (σ, υ) = V nt (σ, υ) .
(ii) Assume υ∗ = eυ : Then, X∗ = eX (employ argument at the end of proof of Theorem
3). According to (i), eV nt (eσt (υ) , υ) ≥ eV nt (σ∗t (υ) , υ) > V nt (σ∗t (υ) , υ) for all t ∈ E. Thus,
E ⊂ eT ∩T ∗ since E ⊂ T ∗ by assumption. Moreover, for all t, eσt ≥ σ∗t (I omit the argumenteυ = υ∗) with strict inequality for t ∈ E. This implies ReT∩T ∗ erteσtdt >
R
eT∩T ∗ rtσ
∗
tdt. Using this,
X∗ = eX and an analogous decomposition to (A.5) for X∗, eX, we obtain:Z
B∗
rtσ
∗
tdt >
Z
eB
erteσtdt, (A.8)
where B∗ := T ∗ −
³eT ∩ T ∗´ and eB := eT − ³eT ∩ T ∗´ . For t ∈ B∗, t0 ∈ eB, we have:
ert0eσt0 ≥ rtσ∗t . (A.9)
(Suppose that ert0eσt0 < rtσ∗t . Then, ert0eσt0 < erteσt, because of (i), and eV nt (eσt, υ) > eV nt0 (eσt0 , υ)
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due to M. Thus t ∈ eT , since t0 ∈ eB ⊂ eT . This contradicts B∗ ∩ eT = ∅.) Using (A.9) in
(A.8), we obtain λ (B∗) > λ
³ eB´ and thus λ (T ∗) > λ³eT´ . (iii) Assume eυ < υ∗ :
Then, eV nt (eσt (eυ) , eυ) = V nt (σ∗t (eυ) , eυ) < V nt (σ∗t (eυ) , υ∗) ≤ V nt (σ∗t (υ∗) , υ∗) ≤ 0 for every
t ∈ (T0 −E)∪ (L− T ∗) . (The Þrst equality follows from t /∈ E. The next two inequalities
follow for any t ∈ L from ∂V nt /∂υ > 0 and the optimality of σ∗t (υ∗) . The last inequality
holds for any t ∈ T0 ∪ (L− T ∗) .) Thus, (T0 −E) ∪ (L− T ∗) ⊂ L − eT ,λ³L− eT´ ≥
λ (T0 − E) + λ (L− T ∗) > λ (L− T ∗) and λ
³eT´ < λ (T ∗) , since λ (T0 − E) > 0 by as-
sumption. QED.
Proof of Fact 3. (a) Suppose that the set of active senders is T with λ (T ) . Applying
(A.2) and (A.3), we get σ∗t = rg (υ) and V
n∗
t = y ln y + (γ − 1) y − c0 for y ≡ rg (υ) .
Thus V n∗ >,=, < 0 if rg (υ) >,=, < y (c0, γ) where y (c0, γ) is deÞned by the condition
ln y = 1 − γ + c0/y. (Note that y > 1 and y increases with c0 and decreases with γ.)
According to (A.1), τ = r2g (υ)λ/µ where λ denotes λ (T ) and µ denotes µ (S) . Using
this and g (υ) = g0υα in ν (s, τ s) = τ−βs we get τ
∗ = (g0r2λ/µ)
1/(1+αβ)
, υ∗ = τ ∗−β and
g (υ∗) = eg0 (µ/ (r2λ))αβ/(1+αβ) with eg0 ≡ g1/(1+αβ)0 . Substitution of g (υ∗) into the con-
dition V n∗t >,=, < 0 gives us λ
∗ = λ0µ (S) r(1−αβ)/(αβ) where λ0 ≡ (eg0/y)1+1/(αβ) . (b)
Local diversity depends on the realized audience allocation. For the equilibrium audience
allocation constructed in the proof of Fact 1, the measure of membership of every s ∈ S
is given by m∗ =∗ r/µ (S) . Since all active senders are identical, attention levels must be
equalized in any equilibrium audience allocation. Moreover, equal attention levels imply
an equal measure of membership for all s ∈ S. Hence, m∗ = λ∗r/µ (S) in any equilibrium.
Substituting λ∗ = λ0µ (S) r(1−αβ)/(αβ) into m∗ = λ∗r/µ (S) we get m∗ = λ0r1/(αβ). QED.
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Table of notations
(S,A, µ) measure space of receiver subjects s
A ∈ A audience
µ (A) measure of audience A
(L,B,λ) measure space of potential senders t
T ∈ B set of active senders
aT ∈ B ×A audience allocation
aT (t) := {s |(t, s) ∈ aT } audience of t under allocation aT
M (s, aT ) := {t |(t, s) ∈ aT } membership of s
λ (T ) aggregate diversity
λ (M (s, aT )) local diversity
ρ (t) radiation capacity of t
rt = min {ρ (t) , µ (S)} range of t
σT : T → R+ signal strength
τ s signal exposure of s
ν (s, ·) : R+ → R++ attention capacity of s
υ = ν (s, τ s) attention level of s under exposure τ s
zt (σ, υ) impact of sender t when sending σ
to receiver with attention υ
Ct (σ, µ (A)) = ct (σ) cost of reaching audience of measure
µ (A) ≤ rt with strength σ
Vt total value of impact achieved by t
V nt = Vt − ct value of t net of cost ct
X :=
R
T
rtσT (t) dt aggregate signal emission
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